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 Recently, we have been witness to a tsunami.  This “third wave” of liberal revolutions in 
Asia, Europe, Africa, and South America has begun to melt away the last frozen remnants of the 
cold war.1  In the wake of these revolutions, as nations and states make the transition to democracy, 
the question arises: “What is to be done about wrongs of the past?”2  
Transitional regimes, in contrast to their autocratic and abusive predecessors, are committed 
to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.  To make good on these commitments, new states 
must seek justice for victims and abusers.  “Justice” is traditionally understood in terms of those 
well-worn coins3 “responsibility,” “crime,” and “punishment.”  It is, then, no surprise that criminal 
trials and punishments often are the standard for justice in transitions.4  Unfortunately, traditional 
theories of criminal jurisprudence have, for the most part, been developed in relatively stable states 
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1 See generally, SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
(1991).   
2 Contemporary conversations about transitional justice owe everything to a debate in print between Diane Ortenlicher 
and Carlos Nino published in the Yale Law Journal.  See Diane Ortenlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, (1991) [hereinafter Settling Accounts); Carlos Nino, The Duty to 
Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, (1991); Diane Ortenlicher, 
A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 YALE L.J. 2641, (1991).  
3 I allude to an image of truth adopted by Jacques Derrida from Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral 
Sense, in PHILOSOPHY AND TRUTH: SELECTIONS FROM NIETZSCHE’S NOTEBOOKS OF THE EARLY 1870’S, 92 (1979). 
4 Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM 
RTS. L. J. 39, 40 (2002). 
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2 
where the ideal is within the reach of aspiration.5  Alluding to John Rawls, Pablo DeGreiff has 
distinguished transitions as “very imperfect worlds.”6  What he points out is that efforts to seek 
justice in transitions face practical challenges that do not disturb views from crystalline castles.7  
These considerations usually lead transitions to pursue “hybrid” programs of justice comprised of 
limited prosecutions focused on top leaders,8 official or de facto amnesties, truth commissions, 
lustration, and reparations.9   
In transitions, and in transitional justice literature, hybrid programs are usually seen as 
compromises born of necessity.10  Transitional regimes admit that it would be better to prosecute all 
who had a hand in past abuses but recognize that it is simply not possible.11  Transitions must settle 
for the best justice possible given very imperfect circumstances.12  Some have characterized the sighs 
that accompany this view as hysterical overreaction, mistaking the practical challenges to justice in 
transitions for insurmountable obstacles rather than simple variations of challenges confronted by 
“ordinary justice.”13  There are, in fact, few, if any, hand-wringers among those interested in 
transitional justice.  It is true that, faced with the compromises borne of necessity, most transitional 
                                                 
5 Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. OF INT’L 
AFF. 647, 661 (1999). 
6 Pablo De Greiff, International Courts and Transitions to Democracy, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 79, 79 (1998); see also BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 74, 75 (1992). 
7 See Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 777-825 (2004).  
8 Ortenlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2602-04. 
9 Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE 
MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 3, 7 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson, eds., 2000). 
10 Id.  
11 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 661. 
12 Michel Rosenfeld, Restitution, Retribution, Political Justice and the Rule of Law, 2 CONSTELLATIONS 309, 310 (1996). 
13 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7.  Sweeping aside the madness, Posner and Vermeule characterize challenges to justice 
in transition as differing from the humdrum problems faced by stable states only in terms of scale.  Transitional justice 
is, then, just “ordinary justice.”  The corresponding advice to transitional justice practitioners is to grin-and-bear it.  
That is slim comfort.  More important, it ignores the distinctive conditions of abusive regimes that are bound to 
problems of scale, which, when properly accounted for, provide significant guidance for a transitional jurisprudence. 
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justice theorists express understandable regret that “more” justice cannot be done.14  However, 
regret that more cannot be done is not the same as giving up on justice entirely.15   
 This article charts a different course, proposing a transitional jurisprudence that is, though 
non-ideal, decidedly positive.  It argues that the unique scale of practical challenges to transitional 
justice present jurisprudential problems that are not satisfied by treating transitional justice as 
ordinary justice.16  In particular, it emphasizes the importance of recognizing that pre-transitional 
states are not simply crime ridden, occupied by awesome numbers of entrepreneurial and 
independent criminals.  Rather, they are defined by social norms, ontologies, and historical 
teleologies that, operating through official state agents, construct a public face of law that sanctions 
and organizes violence perpetrated by institutional actors and private citizens.17  This approach 
appreciates that settling for the “best justice possible” leaves transitional justice theorists and 
practitioners understandably dissatisfied.18  Contrary to the “ordinary justice” approach, however, it 
contends that this discomfort is symptomatic of attempts to shoehorn stable-state justice theories 
into transitions while failing to appreciate that defining features of transitions and pre-transitional 
abuses have normative significance.19   
                                                 
14 Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 235, 237-40. 
15 Id. 
16 RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 3 (2000) 
17 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 59; PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES, 96, 115 (1998); DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS 21 (1996). 
18 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 
22, 27 (pointing out that limited prosecutions entail “political decision[s] with moral implications”).  
19 Frederick Schauer, Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 261, 261-66 
(2003) (discussing various scales of “transition,” and recognizing that massive systemic shifts on the scale revolutions 
present unique practical and normative challenges). 
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Transitional justice is an exercise in “non-ideal” theory.20  As such, it must take positive 
account of the unique conditions found in transitions and their predecessor regimes in constructing 
a transitional jurisprudence.21  By examining the unique conditions in societies capable of mass and 
institutionalized atrocities, this article argues that most folks implicated in past wrongs should qualify 
for an affirmative legal excuse.  Further, it describes how centering transitional justice programs on 
the proper provision of such an excuse justifies hybrid programs featuring vertically limited trials, 
truth commissions, and reparations, as the best, not just the best possible, justice in transitions.22  
This “excuse-centered” approach provides normative justification and practical guidance for hybrid 
programs sufficient to silence the sighs.23 
The excuse-centered approach advanced in this article depends, of course, on the normative 
sustainability of the excuse.  This article focuses on that task.  The first section details the “justice 
gap” that is the defining concern of transitional justice.  The second section explores the normative 
significance of this gap, arguing that mass atrocities are necessarily correlated with a public face of 
law that provides abusers, in their roles as public agents, warrant to believe that their acts are right, 
necessary, or at least not subject to punishment.  Given this, the section concludes that, with the 
exception of high-level leaders, most folks living under an abusive public face of law should qualify 
                                                 
20 I take this term from JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 5, 106 ff. (1999).  Here I argue that transitional regimes are 
heir to what Rawls would call “unfavorable conditions,” which, as Rawls would suggest, set normative, not just 
practical, limitations on justice in transitions. 
21 While the transitional justice literature is rife with descriptive efforts documenting these unique conditions, this article 
occupies a unique position in trying to take normative account of the defining features of transitions.  See ELSTER, 
CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, xi, 79-80 (2004).  But see Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 7, at 763-65 (arguing that the conditions of transitions are neither unique nor demanding of a 
unique normative analysis). 
22 This is an argument that has not been sufficiently made in the literature on transitional justice, but it is critical to a 
satisfying transitional jurisprudence.  See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26. 
23 Though limited prosecutions are not a new idea in Transitional Justice debates, the demand for a normatively 
regulated selection procedure has yet to be filled.  See Ortenlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2603. 
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for an affirmative excuse based on the legality principal, a necessary element of the rule of law to 
which transitional movements commit themselves.  The third and fourth sections defend the 
proposed excuse against challenges from deontological and consquentialist legal theories, 
respectively.  The final section provides a sketch of how the excuse, placed at the center of a 
transitional justice program, provides both justification and practical guidance for other elements of 
the hybrid approach, particularly truth commissions.  While a full defense of truth commissions and 
reparations is beyond the scope of this article, the final section indicates how the proposed approach 
solves some of the most pernicious challenges to truth commissions and “restorative justice.”24 
 
I. THE JUSTICE GAP: PRACTICAL LIMITS ON CRIMINAL TRIALS IN TRANSITIONS   
Among the most striking features of ancién regimes25 are widespread complicity and broad 
participation in abuses.26  Political leaders, military personnel, executive officials, and police are 
among the most notorious culprits,27 but they only mark the surface.  Abusive regimes are 
characterized by innumerable acts of unofficial violence, petty abuse, and discrimination.28  Their 
histories are punctuated by murderous rampages perpetrated by erstwhile spouses, friends and 
neighbors.29  These acts and events are, themselves, girded and sustained by pervasive public 
                                                 
24 See generally, DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (2000); Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and 
Beyond Political Constraints, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 68;  Jennifer Llewelyn, Justice for South Africa: Restorative 
Justice and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in MORAL ISSUES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 96 (1999). 
25 I take this term from Ruti Teitel, who uses it throughout TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).  In addition, I refer to these 
regimes variously as “predecessor regimes,” “pre-transitional regimes,” and “abusive regimes.” 
26 José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political 
Constraints, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE VOL. I, 3, 13 (Neil Kritz, ed., 1995). 
27 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 164-78. 
28 Id. 
29 This was true in Rwanda, see generally GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, and in Macedonia, see Julius Strauss and Christian 
Jennings, Spectre of ethnic cleansing resurrected, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 27, 2001, at 13.            .   
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sentiments that provide support for abuses.30  Members of the international community frequently 
fail to intervene.31  Corporate interests profit from abusive regimes and the victimization of 
subjugated groups.32  In some cases, victims are complicit in the abuse of others.33  When it is time to 
assign responsibility, then, tens of thousands have a share.34   
Despite the incredible demands for justice, transitional governments face severe limitations 
on their capacity to carry out criminal prosecutions.35  One of the most significant is the limited 
availability of bureaucratic resources necessary to conduct prosecutions.36  There are simply not 
enough judges, prosecutors, police, and other officials to meet demands and provide adequate due 
process.37  Ad hoc and permanent international tribunals that attempt to provide additional resources 
have proven to be woefully slow and incapable of making an appreciable dent in the demand.38 
                                                 
30 See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL(2002); KOSOVO REPORT, 33-64 (2000); GOUREVITCH, supra 
note 17, at 47-62, 96-131; GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 27-163, 416-54; JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT 
END, 91-29-99 (1996); CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 41-60 (1996);  Richard Rorty, Human Rights, 
Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 111, 112-15 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley, eds., 1993).  
31 POWER, supra note 30, at 37 (quoting the suicide note of Jewish activist Szmul Zygielbojm). 
32 The infamous Indonesian oil pipeline is perhaps the most notorious recent example of this, but corporate profiteering 
from Nazi crimes was notorious.  Justice from some of these entities has been sought and awarded.  See AUTHERS 
AND WOLFFE, THE VICTIM’S FORTUNE (2002); Madeline Doms, Compensation for Survivors of Slave and Forced Labor, 14 
TRANSNATIONAL LAWYER 171 (2001). 
33 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 152-53; ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED 128 (2000); Areyeh Neier, in DEALING 
WITH THE PAST: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 4 (Alex Boraine et al. eds., 1994). 
34 MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 22-26, HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting Vaclav Havel, New Year’s Address, 
UNCAPTIVE MINDS, 2 (Jan.-Feb. 1990)). 
35 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 208-11; Schauer, supra note 19, at 270-73. 
36 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 777-779. 
37 MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 45 (1996).   
38 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, for example, has been in operation for over ten years but, as of this 
writing, has tried to judgment only twenty-two cases.  www.ictr.org.  This does not constitute a strong objection to 
the existence of these tribunals, whose most important contributions are to international criminal jurisprudence.  
These numbers are only meant to emphasize the impossibility of prosecuting, with full protection of process, all 
those implicated in pre-transitional abuses. 
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Transitions also must face the reality that many of those who could carry out criminal trials 
are tainted by the past.39  If these officials are forced to step down, however, then there are fewer 
prosecutors, judges, clerks, jailers, investigators, and defense attorneys available to conduct 
prosecutions.40   On the other hand, if tainted officials are left in place, transitions must be 
concerned that former agents of abuse cannot be relied upon to blame their cohorts, much less 
themselves.41  Beyond straightforward supply issues, then, transitions face questions about quality 
and potential conflicts of interest that compromise further their ability to prosecute.42   
Transitions also have limited material resources.43  In addition to justice, economic reform, 
infrastructure, democratization, social programs, and myriad other needs make claims on these 
limited resources.44  More often than not, these needs far outstrip the resources of a new nation, 
even without competition from criminal prosecutions.45  In addition, transitional regimes have a 
limited fund of moral capital and public support.46  The citizenry of a new state is seldom uniform in 
its support of a transitional regime.47  Many will be concerned about the direction taken in 
transition.48  There also may be significant skepticism about the moral standing of those charged 
                                                 
39 Schauer, supra note 19, at 270-72; PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 88 (2001); Luc Huyse, Justice After 
Transitions, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 104, 109. 
40 Stanley A. Roberts, Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction in Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
367, 389-90 (2004). 
41 Id. 
42 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 72, 74-75. 
43 Id. 
44 Zalaquett, supra note 26, at 20. 
45 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 208-15. 
46 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 72; David Pion-Berlin, To Prosecute or to Pardon?: Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American 
Southern Cone, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 82. 
47 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 123, 127-28. 
48 Id. 
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with carrying out transitional programs.49  Finally, a people exhausted by years of oppression and 
revolution may not have the energy to sustain long public procedures, particularly if it means 
delaying other transitional projects.50  In this narrow window of opportunity, transitions must 
consider where it is best to spend precious resources.  Efforts to address past wrongs should not be 
pursued at the expense of other transitional goals if the trade-off threatens the success of a transition 
itself.51     
The practical limitations on justice in transitions translate into a number of more theoretical 
problems.  First, procedural justice, a necessary corollary of the rule of law, is frequently 
compromised.52  In transitional circumstances, opportunities for vengeance abound and extra-judicial 
punishment, including execution, is common,53 particularly when justice is left in the hands of those 
without professional training or political accountability.54  Due process rights are threatened as those 
arrested wait to be charged, wait for assistance of counsel, and wait for years to get their day in 
court.55  Such results threaten the moral and political standing of transitions by compromising 
commitments to the rule of law. 
Second, equal distribution of justice is compromised.  Because, as a matter of fact, not 
everyone implicated in past abuses can be tried, all prosecutions will be selective.56  If the selections 
                                                 
49 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 72. 
50 Id. at 69-81. 
51 De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81. 
52 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 88, 235-40. 
53 Id. at 97-99. 
54 Id. 
55 This is even true in the “more ideal” circumstances of the ad hoc criminal tribunals.  See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR-
97-19, Decision of the Appeals Chamber (Nov. 3, 1999) (releasing defendant for speedy trial violations). 
56 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 208-15; HAYNER, supra note 39, at 12; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-27; van 
Zyl, supra note 5, at 666; MINOW, supra note 37, at 31, 40-47. 
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are driven by necessity, it is unlikely that choices will be made on principle.57  Ad hoc distinctions 
and novel, post facto, rules breach transitional commitments to democracy and the rule of law,58 while 
threatening to put the new regime in the same moral position as its predecessor.59  The results of 
these selections are also, frequently, counterintuitive.  Underlings are tried and punished while high-
level leaders escape prosecution, often by exploiting the fruits of their abuses.60  Thus, limitations on 
resources result in too many and too few being punished, too severely and not severely enough.   
Third, if criminal punishment is the standard, then justice will not be served in transitions.  
Transitions cannot, as a matter of fact, prosecute all wrongdoers.61  As a result, many, if not most, of 
the guilty will escape scot-free, including many of those most responsible.62  This circumstantial 
parsimony implies that those who are not prosecuted are innocent of any wrongdoing and their 
victims have suffered no wrong.63   
Finally, selective prosecutions only address some wrongs, some wrongdoers, and some 
victims.  Thus, they fail to establish a complete and publicly legitimate account of the past.64  This 
failure denies justice to victims whose abuses are never made part of the record.65  Moreover, the 
nature of the “truth” established in a criminal trial is limited by the purposes of the trial—to 
establish the guilt or innocence of particular individuals charged with particular acts—rules of 
                                                 
57 MINOW, supra note 37, at 31, 40-44. 
58 Martin Golding, Retroactive Legislation and Restoration of the Rule of Law, ANN. REV. OF L. & ETHICS, 169, 170-174 (1996); 
see also ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83, 235-40.   
59 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83; LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW at 39, 248-249 (1969).   
60 James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORD. INT’L L.J. 616, 641-42 (2005). 
61 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 51-53. 
62 Kiss, supra note 24, at 68; De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81-82. 
63 Pablo De Greiff, Trial and Punishment: Pardon and Oblivion, 22 PHIL. & SOC. CRIT. 93, 105 (1996). 
64 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, I, chap. 1, para. 7, 24, chap. 5, para. 71, 73. 
65 Rotberg, supra note 9, at 3; Minow, supra note 14, at 235. 
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evidence, and other formalities.66  This is a limited truth67 that opens the door for revisionism and 
potential backlash by failing to meet the transitional need for a full, historical, and politically 
legitimate account of the past.68    
 The justice gap that opens in transitions is most frequently filled with alternative theories of 
justice, such as restorative justice, 69 and alternative procedures, such as truth commissions.70  As 
products of necessity, however, these efforts often appear as no more than accommodations that 
provide the best justice possible given the imperfect circumstances in transitions.71  This is deeply 
dissatisfying for both practitioners and theorists. 
 In my view, a valid and usable theory of transitional justice must take normative account of 
these practical concerns, not simply accommodate them.  Given that prosecutions in transitions 
cannot, as a matter of fact, be complete, a “non-ideal” theory of transitional justice must propose a 
way to make prosecutorial selections rational.72  It must provide a morally sustainable justification for 
the parsimony implied by selectivity.73  It also must present the possibility that transitions can 
                                                 
66 HAYNER, supra note 39, at 100-02; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 40-41. 
67 MINOW, supra note 37, at 47, 60. 
68 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 658-61, 667. 
69 The concept of “restorative” justice has a topic of significant discussion in the literature on transitional justice.  See e.g. 
Kiss, supra note 24, at 68-69; Llewellyn, supra note 24, at 96.  Restorative justice has also, increasingly, become a topic 
of interest for stable state theorists.  See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime?: Prospects for Restorative Justice in the 
United States, 1 UTAH L. REV. 413 (2003).  This literature builds on earlier work done on rehabilitative and educative 
justice more generally.  See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 
(1984).   
70 Priscilla Hayner provided the first survey of contemporary truth commissions in Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: 
A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS Q. 597 (1994).  She expanded and deepened her study in UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: 
FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2001). 
71 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-26. 
72 De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81. 
73 Id. 
An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming) 
 
11 
accomplish these goals within the limitations presented by their circumstances.  Rationalizing 
transitional justice programs as the “best justice possible” simply does not turn the trick.74   
In the remaining sections, this article argues for a transitional justice program centered on 
making prosecutorial selections according to an affirmative defense based on the legality principle.  
This “excuse-centered” approach offers a rational justification for exercising selectivity in transitions 
and provides guidance and justification for other common features of transitional justice programs.  
 
II. THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRACTICAL CONCERNS 
 Treating broad complicity as a practical limitation on trials in transitions begs a critical 
question confronting transitional movements: “How could so many join to perpetrate atrocities?”  In 
this section I contend that mass atrocities are, in part, a function of social and legal norms.  Absent a 
socio-legal environment that supports abuse, abuses on the scale confronted by transitions would 
not occur.  Taking account of this leads me to argue that most who participated in pre-transitional 
abuses should be excused from prosecution. 
 
A. The Role of an Abusive Public Face of Law in Abusive Regimes 
Who doubts that the Argentine or Chilean murderers of people who opposed the recent 
authoritarian regimes thought that their victims deserved to die?  Who doubts that the Tutsis 
who slaughtered Hutus in Burundi or the Hutus who slaughtered Tutsis in Rwanda, that one 
Lebanese militia which slaughtered the civilian supporters of another, that the Serbs who 
have killed Croats or Bosnian Muslims, did so out of conviction in the justice of their 
actions?  Why do we not believe that same for the German perpetrators? 
—Daniel Goldhagen75 
                                                 
74 Posner and Vermeule argue the contrary in Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, supra note 7.  
75 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 14-15. 
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 Genocide, after all, is an exercise in community building.76 
—Philip Gourevitch  
Mass atrocities on a scale that calls for programs of transitional justice are not phenomena of 
happenstance in which thousands of agents independently and simultaneously decide to murder 
their neighbors.77  The scale, breadth, and duration of these abuses evidence the fact that that there 
is something that distinguishes the targeted violence committed by and under abusive regimes from 
common criminal activity.78  One salient and important distinguishing feature is the role that law, 
social norms, and publicly circulated and officially sanctioned beliefs, 79 collectively the “public face 
of law,” play in abusive regimes.80  
When looking at the Nazi Holocaust, or any number of genocides before and since, it is 
tempting to think that only evil, irrational, or savage people could perpetrate these horrific acts on 
such a terrible scale.81  Normal people, people like us, could never do what they did—at least not 
willingly.82  While comforting, this intuition obscures an essential feature of mass violence: the 
                                                 
76 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 95. 
77 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 15. 
78 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 660-61. 
79 These include a social ontology and a historical teleology. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 47-62, 96-131; 
GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 27-164; MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 71-99; NINO, supra note 30, at 41-60;  
Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15.  Social ontologies are normalized typologies in which individuals are typed and situated 
hierarchically.  Teleologies provide abusive regimes with an account of the current conflict in a broader historical 
context.  Referring to this background, abusive regimes solve current disorder by devising and executing strategies 
designed to make the real world better approximate their ideal end of history.  This “final solution” often means 
eliminating the target group entirely.   
80 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 18-20.  
81 Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15.   
82 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 14. 
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greatest of evils are perpetrated not by devils,83 but by and with the support of average citizens.84  
Genocide and other mass atrocities simply could not occur without the participation and aid of 
“willing executioners.”85 
There are many implicated in mass violence who were not so willing, of course.86  Duress is a 
frequent tool of abusive regimes;87 and those faced with a “kill or be killed” ultimatum cannot, by 
definition, be described as “willing.”88  Those manipulated by combinations of drugs, brainwashing, 
and threats, including child soldiers,89 who have been implicated in abuses committed in Sierra 
Leone,90 Liberia,91 the Ivory Coast, Uganda,92 Congo, and Columbia,93 also do not fit neatly into the 
category of “willing executioners.”94  In all abusive regimes there also are those who actively oppose, 
protest, and work to prevent atrocities.95  Abusive regimes are, in short, far from homogenous.  
                                                 
83 I use this word conscious of, but distinct from, its Kantian meaning.  See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE, 
8:355-85; IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A COSMOPOLITAN INTENT, 8:21-6.  My argument in this article is 
centered on the proposition that mass atrocities are perpetrated by members of the human race, Kant’s race of devils, 
who, having failed to bind their actions to the demands of moral right, are subjects of law.  I do not, however, 
propose to forgive the moral lapses of pre-transitional abusers any more than Kant forgives those who fail to do their 
moral duty.  Devils are devils still, no matter the ineffectiveness of a devils’ solution. 
84 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 115; GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 164-66; Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15. 
85 I take this phrase from GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17.   
86 MINOW, supra note 37, at 35-36. 
87 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 96, 249.  
88 Matthew Happold, Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1131, 1163 (2002). 
89 See generally, RACHEL BRETT & MARGARET MCCALLIN, CHILDREN: THE INVISIBLE SOLDIERS (2d ed. 1998). 
90 Norimitsu Onishi, Children of War in Sierra Leone Try to Start Over, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2002, at A14. 
91 Human Rights Watch, How to Fight to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia (2004), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/liberia2. 
92 Human Rights Watch, Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda (2003), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303. 
93 Human Rights Watch, You’ll Learn not to Cry: Child Combatants in Columbia (2003), available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903. 
94 Happold, supra note 88, at 1138, 1158-63. 
95 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 99. 
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Even when these complexities are taken into account, however, it remains the case that 
institutionalized atrocities require the support and participation of broad swaths of the citizenry, 
including active participants, passive supporters, opportunistic profiteers, and those who indulge in 
naïve denial.96  While we may applaud the heroes, then, we are left to wonder how so many were led 
to such madness.  The key to answering this question is to take seriously the possibility that the 
practical realities of scale and complicity that distinguish abusive regimes are not merely differences 
in magnitude, as compared to the everyday problems that face “ordinary justice,”97 but, rather, serve 
as markers for unique social conditions that carry normative force, making it impossible to simply 
dismiss transitional justice as a special case of everyday justice.   
In stable states there is a close identification between norms and the norm.98  Wrongs, as 
crimes, are the exception, perpetrated in violation of established and regularly enforced legal codes.  
By contrast, in abusive regimes targeted abuse is the norm.99  Widespread abuses identify and are 
institutional tools of pre-transitional states.100  In ancién regimes, black-letter law frequently fails to 
condemn, supports, or even demands acts of abuse.101  Executive and judicial agents participate in 
these activities, either directly or by sustaining an environment in which murder and other abuses are 
                                                 
96 Frau Maria, mother of the repentant soldier in Simon Wiesenthal’s famous essay THE SUNFLOWER, 84-94 (1998), is 
the paradigmatic example for this class.   
97 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 777-825. 
98 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 661. 
99 Id. at 660-61 
100 Rajeev Bhargava, Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 45, 46-50.  This “symmetric 
barbarity” is what Bhargava contends distinguishes pre-transitional regimes that are appropriate subjects of 
transitional justice from programs of abuse carried out by a few perpetrators without the popular knowledge or 
support of society and social institutions. 
101 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 96, 123; Argentina Executive Decree No. 158/83, Dec. 13, 1983, available as part of 
NUNCA MAS at http://www.nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_281.htm. (Part V provides extensive 
documentation of the role played by the fight against imperialism in the minds, policies, and actions of those who 
fought the Dirty War.); see also RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 62 (1961). 
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allowed to flourish.102  Police and the military join local officials in organizing and perpetrating 
offenses in the name of the state.103  Other public officials organize programs of systematic 
discrimination.104  These official acts form part of a “public face of law” that provides license for the 
events that cry out for justice in transition.  In recognition of the role played by the public face of 
law in abusive regimes, transitions count amongst their highest goals sponsoring personal and 
institutional reforms committed to democratic ideals, human rights, and the rule of law.105   
 The “public face of law,” composed of these elements, is not the same as black-letter law.  In 
some regimes, black-letter law requires abuse.  This is not always the case, however.  In many 
regimes, laws on the books prohibit murder, rape, and other acts of violence.106  Unfortunately, “in 
transitional periods, there is commonly a large gap between the law as written and as it is 
perceived.”107  This perception, which reflects the reality of what law is in abusive regimes, is 
regulated by social and institutional elements of the public face of law, which affect perceptions of 
what is and is not prohibited108 and, perhaps more importantly, who is and who is not subject to legal 
protections.109  Mass atrocities are not a coincidental collection of independent acts.  Large-scale 
                                                 
102 The Nazi regime presents, perhaps, the most pernicious example of official participation in abuse.  See, e.g., 
GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 97; SIMON WIESENTHAL, EVERY DAY IS REMEMBRANCE DAY 11-28 (1987); EUGENE 
DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 7 (1966), but some level of public support is a ubiquitous and necessary 
condition of the mass violence that precedes transitional movements, presenting the need for systemic reform. 
103 ALAN ROSENBAUM, PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 11-12 (1993). 
104 HILBERG, supra note 101, at 6. 
105 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83; TEITEL, supra note 16, at 29. 
106 Sanford Levinson, Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 211, 219. 
107 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 19. 
108 Id. at 18-20. 
109 Abusive regimes frequently justify abuses by re-classifying victims such that they cannot be “murdered” or “raped.”  
See Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-114. 
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abuses happen for a reason.110  In pre-transitional regimes the institutions that organize abuse reflect 
a deeper social ethos, a historical ontology, and a narrative truth, that presents abusive practices as 
rational or, in some cases, necessary.111  The Nazi Holocaust provides a stark example.   
Nazi crimes, and the support provided by ordinary Germans during the Holocaust, were 
sponsored by an “eliminationist anti-Semitism”112 that foretold a complete eradication of European 
Jews.113  Public norms and an officially sanctioned public face of law, disseminated and enforced by 
bureaucratic, executive, and military agents, played a critical role in the targeting of Jews and Gypsies 
for death in Nazi occupied Europe from 1935 to 1945.114  From the first experiments with violence 
preceding the passage of the Nuremberg Laws to Kristallnacht to the full-scale mechanized murders 
perpetrated in concentration camps, Nazis’ killing of Jews was consistent with a publicly circulated 
view that Jews had to be eliminated.115   
 The Nazis are not alone in drawing on historical teleology and social ontology to guide and 
justify mass atrocity.  Richard Rorty points out that a dehumanizing ontology, in combination with a 
historical ontology, was at the center of atrocities perpetrated in Bosnia, where abusers did not see 
themselves as committing offenses because they did not view their victims as humans.116  In a 
                                                 
110 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 180.  This should not be confused with cultural or social determinism.  The point is 
that certain social conditions are necessary for mass atrocities.  Social mores do not act, however, and, just as individual 
choices and actions are necessary conditions, so are the individual moral failures that attend individual actions.  See 
GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 20-22.  As I argue below, these moral failures cannot be subject to legal punishment. 
111 Id. at 3-26, 50; WIESENTHAL, supra note 102, at 15.   
112 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 49-128.  
113 ROSENBAUM, supra note 103, at 11 (“A review of some of the fateful occurrences that eventuated in the Nazi ‘Final 
Solution to the Jewish Question’ will demonstrate that the exterminative activities were the outcome of, among other 
factors, a virulent antisemitism.”); WIESENTHAL, supra note 102, at 15; also, see generally, JEREMY COHEN, THE FRIARS 
AND THE JEWS: THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL ANTI-JUDAISM (1982); JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG, THE DEVIL AND 
THE JEWS: THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPTION FO THE JEW AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN ANTI-SEMITISM (1983). 
114 WIESENTHAL, supra note 102, at 11-28; DAVIDSON, supra note 102, at 7. 
115 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 8, 11-13, 416-54; ROSENBAUM, supra note 103, at 11.   
116 Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-16. 
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chilling account of the Rwandan massacre, Phillip Gourevitch explains that the bodies that washed 
up on the shores of Lake Kivu and Lake Victoria were sent on their way back to Ethiopia at the 
direction of Hutu authorities as an expression of a historical ontology in which tall and light-skinned 
Tutsis were aggressors from the North to be sent back on the waters that brought them.117  Asserted 
differences in race and biology are frequent sources for abusive ontologies.118  An abuse sustaining 
truth can also be more obviously political, as was the case in Argentina, where the “Dirty War” on 
communism allowed state agents to torture, disappear, and murder thousands of Argentines;119 or 
even consciously constructed, as John Dower documents was the case with war crimes perpetrated 
in the Pacific during World War II.120   
In some cases, state approval is tacit, manifested by passivity in the face of abuses.121  In 
other cases state support is active and organized.122  In some cases laws against murder are not 
enforced or are interpreted as not protecting some groups.123  In other cases black-letter law or 
official state policies requires murder.124  In all cases, however, state support, expressed as an abusive 
public face of law, is a necessary corollary of mass atrocity.  To conclude the contrary would be to 
                                                 
117 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 47-62; see also Collette Braekman, Incitement to Genocide, in CRIMES OF WAR 192 
(Gutmann et al. eds., 1999); Human Rights Watch report, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY (1999), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda.   
118 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 55, 66-69; RICHARD LERNER, FINAL SOLUTIONS: BIOLOGY, PREJUDICE AND 
GENOCIDE (1992); ROBERT WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED (1991). 
119  MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 71-145; NINO, supra note 30, at 44-50; Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and 
Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons and the Argentine Case, in ARMIES & POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA, 96 (Abraham 
Lowenthal and Samuel Fitch, eds., 1986); Alexandre Barros and Edmundo Coelho, Military Intervention and Withdrawal 
in South America, in ARMIES & POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 437-443; The Doctrine of National Security places Argentina 
firmly within the framework of the conflict between the Superpowers in a Third World War, in NUNCA MAS, Part V. 
120 JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR (1986). 
121 The most notorious contemporary examples of tacit government approval of abuses come from Columbia.  See 
Noam Chomsky, ROGUE STATES: THE RULE OF FORCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS 62 (2000). 
122 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 85-96. 
123 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 18-20; GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 97-98; Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15. 
124 GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 96, 123. 
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claim that the Holocaust, the Argentine Dirty War, the abuses of Apartheid, and the Rwandan 
Massacre were no more than unhappy coincidences of independent criminal action.  
Calls for transition, and the institutional and social reforms that transitions entail, serve as 
further evidence of this descriptive claim.  While acts of violence stand out against the backdrop of a 
stable state, the acts that characterize pre-transitional societies blend into a society whose pathology 
runs so deep that massive political, social, cultural, and legal change is necessary.125  The requirement 
for reform only makes sense if one recognizes that there is something deeply wrong with abusive 
regimes.126  An abusive public face of law is both evidence of what is wrong and, as expressed and 
advanced through public institutions, a tool of atrocity and the social truths that rationalize and 
sustain abuse.127   
 It does not, for the moment, matter where the “truth” that underlies and sustains abusive 
regimes comes from.  Whether it is a result of colonial involvement, political strategy, or timeless 
narrative, the effect is the same: there is a rational social grounding for pre-transitional abuses.128  
This socio-ontological support combines with actual laws on the books, official doctrine, and state 
practice to construct an abusive public face of law that affects interpretations of legal duty in abusive 
                                                 
125 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 661 (pointing out that criminal justice is more appropriate for stable states where abuses are 
the exception rather than the norm). 
126 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 5. 
127 I allude, here, to Michel Foucault’s famous “Regime of Truth.”  Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, THE FOUCAULT 
READER at 74 (Paul Rabinow, ed., 1984).  While the transitional justice literature does not yet include a rigorous 
ethnography of abusive regimes, the literature is rife with monographs documenting the intricate interplay of truth, 
institutions, and practices of power in the genesis of atrocities.  See, e.g., POWER, supra note 30;  GOUREVITCH, supra 
note 17; MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30; NINO, supra note 30; GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17; MARK DANNER, 
MASSACRE AT EL MAZOTE (1993). 
128 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 14-15. 
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states and establishes the conditions necessary to perpetrate mass atrocities on a scale that requires 
systemic transition and transitional justice.129   
The public face of law in abusive regimes and the role that it plays in individual actions 
highlights a critical difference between normal criminal activity and abuses committed by and under 
abusive regimes without obscuring the importance of heterogeneity in pre-transitional states.  Those 
who participate in mass violence choose to become abusers, some grudgingly, and some with 
frightening enthusiasm.  The critical point that I will defend in this article is that these choices are 
not made in solipsistic isolation.  Abusive regimes are “burdened” societies.130  Atrocities committed 
by and under abusive regimes reflect an operating set of socially generated and publicly circulated 
beliefs that, in combination with institutional practices and government policies, form a public face 
of law that at least does not forbid violence against a victim group, and often actively encourages it.  
By making this claim I do not mean to defend or rely upon cultural determinism.131  Those 
living under abusive regimes can choose not to participate in atrocities.  That is a fact evidenced by 
those who oppose abusive regimes from within, often at great peril of their own lives.  I also do not 
contend that conformance to an abusive public face of law justifies abuse.  Rape, murder, and 
torture are evils no matter what the law says.132  The only claim that I will make, the only claim that 
need be made, is that the public face of law, as it appears to reasonable people living under an 
abusive regime, does not forbid, and frequently encourages, human rights violations directed against 
                                                 
129 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83; TEITEL, supra note 16, at 29. 
130 RAWLS, supra note 20, at 5, 106 ff.   
131 Cultural Defenses: One Person’s Culture is Another Person’s Crime, 9 LOY. L.A. INTL. & COMP. L.J. 751 (1987); The Cultural 
Defense in Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986); Julia Sams, The Availability of the ‘Cultural Defense’ as an Excuse for 
Criminal Behavior, 16 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 335 (1986), and The defense is not all that new, however.  See Rex v. 
Esop, 7 C. & P. 456 (1836). 
132 Ronald Dworkin, Internal Realism, available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2001/readings/readings2/internalrealism.pdf; Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity 
and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (1996). 
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particular individuals and groups.133  This official support distinguishes institutionalized mass 
violence from banal criminal activity or small-scale abuses of power perpetrated by cadres of 
opportunists134—the conditions well-understood by “ordinary justice.”   
 
B. The Normative Significance of an Abusive Public Face of Law 
The fact that past wrongs enjoyed official and social approval provides the substance of 
significant deontological and consequentialist challenge to criminal trials in transitions to 
democracy.135  Transitional movements count among their highest commitments dedication to the 
rule of law.136  The rule of law, which shapes the call for trials in transitions, retains a strong 
commitment to the principle of non malum sine lege, or the legality principle.137  Whether rendered as 
non malum sine lege or a prohibition against ex post facto138 enforcement of law, the principle of legality 
prohibits states from punishing acts that were not against the law at the time they were committed.   
The problem of legality is at the center transitional of justice debates.139  The Constitutional 
Court of Hungary met the issue in its review of a law allowing prosecutions of those responsible for 
                                                 
133 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 14-15, 80-163; GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 96, 110-131. 
134 Bhargava, supra note 100 at 46-50.   
135 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 59, 75. 
136 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83, 235-40; Golding, supra note 58, at 170-174; MINOW, supra note 37, at 25, 30-37.  
137  Id.; see also, ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 70-74 (4th ed. 2003); HERBERT PACKER, THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-87 (1968); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 27-69 
(2d ed. 1960); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 650-51 (1958) 
[hereinafter Reply]; FULLER, supra note 59, at 39, 248-249. 
138 The United States Constitution establishes the principal in these terms.  See Article I, §§9, 10. 
139 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 75; ELSTER, supra note 21, at 235-40; TEITEL, supra note 16, at 11-26, 33-36; David 
Crocker, Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 99, 105-06; 
ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 74 ff.;  FULLER, supra note 59, at 245-253.  Contemporary discussions of legality in the 
context of transitional justice owe a debt to H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller and their series of articles in the Harvard 
Law Journal known as the Hart-Fuller debate. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593, 615-24 (1958); Fuller, Reply, supra note 137, at 648-61.    
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the suppression of the 1956 uprising.140  The law repealed statutes of limitation and criminalized 
activities that were encouraged under the predecessor regime.  When called to rule on the 
constitutionality of the new law, the equally new Constitutional Court recognized a “paradox of the 
revolution of the rule of law” and found itself forced to decide between “the principle of 
predictability and foreseeability” which grounds the “criminal law’s prohibition of the use of 
retroactive legislation,” and the rule of law understood as “substantive justice.”141  For the Court, the 
paradox was a result of a situational division between the rule of law as an agent of right and the rule 
of law as a regulative ideal.  In the end, the Court decided that the revolutionary role of law as an 
agent of change could not trump the principles of predictability internal to the rule of law.142  
 German courts faced an almost identical issue in the border-guards cases.143  The guards 
accused of shooting East Germans fleeing across the border claimed that they were executing a legal 
duty.144  The German were asked to decide to what extent the law of the previous regime provided a 
defense.  Recognizing that laws, such as those under which the border guards acted, may be formally 
right but were not substantively right, the Germans allowed the prosecutions to proceed.145  In terms 
of the dilemma posed by the principle of legality, they were prepared to choose the transformative 
potential of the law over its formal duties to predictability and fair warning. 
                                                 
140 Judgment of March 5, 1992, Magyar Közlony No. 23/1992 (Hungary, Constitutional Court, 1992), translated in J. OF 
CONST. L. IN EAST. & CENT. EUR. I 136 (1994). 
141 Id. 
142 Id.; accord No. 2086/A/1991/14, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, VOL. III, at 629, 635-36; see also SOLYOM 
AND BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY, 19 (2000). 
143 Berlin State Court, No. (523) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91), in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, VOL. III, at 576. 
144 Id.; TEITEL, supra note 16, at 16-18. 
145 Id. 
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 These are but two examples.  Because of the critical role played by the public face of law in 
abusive regimes, all transitions confront legality.  That courts have come to different conclusions 
emphasizes the difficulty of the issues.  
 
1. The legality principle as an excusing condition for most implicated in pre-transitional abuses. 
Given that mass atrocities enjoy state support and comport with the prevailing public face of 
law, broad criminal prosecutions in transitions would violate the principle of legality with respect to 
most who might be targeted for prosecution.  Taking account of legality in transitions does not, 
however, require forgoing all prosecutions.  Rather, a proper accounting of legality concerns results 
in vertically limited prosecutions146 that focus on high-level leaders, who are directly exposed to the 
demands of international law prohibitions against genocide147 and crimes against humanity,148 each of 
which can provide grounds for individual criminal liability. 149 
                                                 
146  I am in debt to Paul van Zyl for this terminology.   
147 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.  For an exhaustive 
account of the Convention, its genesis, application, and challenges, see generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000).  The Convention has a colored and complicated history internationally and in the 
United States.  For an engaging account, see POWER, supra note 30, at 46-169. 
148 Crimes against humanity first became a critical tool of international law practice after World War II as part of the 
Nuremberg Charter.  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and 
Establishing Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, Art. 6(c) (1951).  The most current iteration of 
crimes against humanity in international law is found in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 7(1)(b).   
149 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, No, ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T 
(2 Sept. 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1 (7 May 1997); United States v. Ohlendorf et al. (“Einsatzgruppen trial”) 
(1948). 
An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming) 
 
23 
 For an act to be a crime, it must be a transgression of law—nullum crimen sine lege.150  The 
principle of legality in criminal jurisprudence is centered on two concerns.  First, the fair and 
legitimate use of the police power of the state is predicated on an obligation of fair warning—nulla 
poena sine lege.151  Citizens must have a reasonable chance to know the law so that they will know 
which acts will be punished and which not.  This is really two requirements, one of formal 
warning152 and one of clarity.153  Black-letter law or consistent state action satisfy the first 
requirement.154  Lucidity, publicity, and regular enforcement satisfy the second.155  Laws that are 
excessively vague, providing little or no guidance, are not enforceable.156   
 The second concern that motivates the principle of legality centers on those charged with 
enforcing the law.  Two key principles of fairness in the enforcement of law are predictability and 
consistency.157  Black-letter law provides enforcement officials with the basic guidelines that they 
need to regulate social behavior.  Clear law guards against “discriminatory and arbitrary 
                                                 
150 The legality principle is widely viewed as a central tenet of “The Rule of Law.”  See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 102-121 (1982); FULLER, supra note 59, at 51-65, 245-53; JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 238 (1971).  For a more detailed account of how this principle is an essential feature 
of the rule of law in new democracies see Golding, supra note 58, at 170-174.  The Constitutional Rule against 
retrospective enforcement, the core of the legality requirement, is set out in Article I, §§9, 10 of the United States 
Constitution “No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” 
151 HALL, supra note 137, at 27-64; FULLER, supra note 59, at 58, 59. 
152 The requirement for some form of law is central to both Roman and common law traditions.  See A.T. DENNING, 
FREEDOM UNDER THE LAW (1949) 40-42; Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, House of Lords [1962] A.C. 220.  Shaw 
has met with some dispute in the academic community.  See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 7-12 
(1963).  These objections, however, do not go to the central rule forwarded in Shaw, namely that judges may not 
create offenses for individuals out of vague commitments to public good. 
153 John Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985); FULLER, supra note 59, 
at 63-65;  Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, No. 2086/A/1991/14, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, 
VOL. III, at 629, Preamble, Part IV(3) & (4). 
154 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 19 (“The validity of prior law depended on the social practices of the time, such as the 
norm’s publication and transparency.”). 
155 PACKER, supra note 137, at 287. 
156 Jeffries, supra note 153, at 192.    
157 HALL, supra note 137, at 36-54. 
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enforcement.”158  Without law, police agents may act on their own impulses and enforcement of 
social mores will be arbitrary, completely dependent upon the officer, prosecutor, or judge at 
hand.159  Law provides a hub about which enforcement activities revolve.  The principle of legality 
ensures that regulation of social action, and the use of state police power over individuals, will be 
rule-bound, consistent, fair, and legitimate. 160 
 Both of these justifications of the legality principle focus on the role that the judiciary and 
the executive play in democratic regimes and under the rule of law.  Judges and courts have the 
limited duty to apply law.161  Law itself is to be propagated by other processes of justification.162  
Courts may not, as a rule, indulge in this legislative behavior.  The law that they are charged with 
applying binds them.163  Without law to apply, courts and police are powerless to act or, rather, 
without moral and legal authority to act.  Exercise of state power in the absence of legal authority is 
a hallmark of abusive regimes.164 
 One might favor a more active role for judges.  Indeed, one of the reasons offered in favor 
of criminal trials in transitions suggests that trials can establish and model the rule of law and claim 
                                                 
158 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 773, 774-775 (1974). 
159 While the regulative principle of legality plays a key role in states committed to the rule of law, abusive regimes are 
defined by their use of state authority to emphasize the personal power of individuals and the enigmatic power of the 
regime.  See MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 125-39 (discussing the “disarticulating” use of power in abusive 
regimes).   
160 Jeffries, supra note 153, at 192 ff.  Notably, this version of “fairness” does not include a requirement that the law is 
“right.”  The premium is on clarity and forewarning. 
161 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 115, 171-74 (1996); R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 138 
(1986). 
162 Id. 
163 The idea that written rules can actually bind judges is contested.  See, e.g., Kenneth Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and 
Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE 115 (Stanford 
Levinson and Steven Mailloux, eds.,1988); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989), particularly 
Chapters 4, 5, and 13; but see RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988); 
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 527 (1982). 
164 MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 125-39; FULLER, supra note 59, at 245-53. 
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ground for an independent judiciary.165  Moreover, the judiciary has historically proven to be a 
valuable agent of reform in stable societies.166  Given these potentials, it might seem odd to take 
such a strict view of the judiciary’s role in transitions when the need for reform is so great.167  There 
are two points to be made here.  First, the criminal law may not be the best tool in the arsenal of an 
activist court.  Reflection on the legislative adventures of American and British courts, for example, 
favors activism only to sponsor tort or regulatory reform.168  Where courts do use the criminal law in 
a reform capacity it is usually to add excuses or justifications rather than create new crimes.  This is a 
reflection of the principle of legality.169  Second, even if one were to approve the actions of an 
activist court in creating new criminal prohibitions; this does not solve the legality concern.  Law 
written ex post facto is no more just for having been constructed by judges than it would be if passed 
by a legislature.      
The principle of legality, as I have presented it, might strike some readers as unique to a 
positivist conception of the law.170  Specifically, the principle may seem to imply that “law” is limited 
to black-letter law, without regard to natural right.171  Such a perspective begs important questions 
about the source and nature of law and ignores a long tradition of scholarship that argues for a close 
                                                 
165 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 23-26. 
166 Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2446-51 (2004) (discussing rise of 
policy litigation after Brown v. Board). 
167 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 22-26; ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 99-112. 
168 See generally Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity, 99 
COLUM. L. REV (2000); Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV 1657 (1999); Louis 
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV 509 (1986); Michael Graetz, Legal Transitions: The 
Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). 
169 Jeffries, supra note 153, at 191-95.  This strong attachment to the legality principle in the criminal context coupled 
with a willingness to relax the principle in tort law has long-standing in the American system.  See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
170 Judgment of Jan. 20, 1992, Juristenzeitung 13 (1992): 691, 695 (F.R.G., Landericht, Berlin).   
171 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, 184 (1954). 
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relationship between morality and law.172  I will discuss these concerns in later sections of this article.  
For now, it will suffice to raise a few points for consideration.   
First, to the extent that the legality principle is positivist, the rule of law is positivist.  This is 
not as bold a commitment as one might think.  One need not believe that law and morality are 
entirely separable173 to believe that laws on the books play an essential role in the fair and just 
exercise of legal force.  The “rule of law” is not the same as the “rule of laws,” which more aptly 
describes the “pejorative”174 use of positivism.175  Non-pejorative positivism simply points out that 
law and morals are not necessarily linked in fact.176  The principle of legality is positivist insofar as it 
recognizes that law and right may sometimes diverge in fact.  Where this occurs, the principle 
contends that punishment cannot be justified based on morality alone.177   
Second, these debates are, in the present context, beside the point.  There may be other ways 
to conceive of the law that, hypothetically, would not be committed to the principle of legality.  
Speculation about these other worlds serves little purpose in the present debate, however, because 
legality is, as a matter of fact, central to the rule of law as it has developed in constitutional 
democracies.178  Faith to legality and the rule of law is a central aspirational goal of transitions,179 in 
                                                 
172 This debate is as old as law itself and has been central to the thinking of most philosophers of law since Socrates.  
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller discuss the problem in the Hart-Fuller debate, supra note 139 at 593 ff., and Fuller, Reply, 
supra note 137, at 630 ff.  Notably, Hart concedes that laws in a well-ordered legal regime should coincide with core 
features of social morality. 
173 AUSTIN, supra note 171 at 184. 
174 Hart, supra note 139 at 595. 
175 Golding, supra note 58, at 171, 172. 
176 AUSTIN, supra note 171 at 184-85. 
177 HALL, supra note 137, at 36-54, 58-64.  This position is entirely consistent with the claim that one has a moral 
obligation not to obey immoral demands.  See Fuller, Reply, supra note 137 at 651-53.     
178 Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 321, 331 (2002). 
179 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83, 235-36; Golding, supra note 58, at 171-72; FULLER, supra note 59, at 248-49, 252. 
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contrast to their predecessors.  In the context of transitions to democracy, then, rejecting legality 
would change the face of the movement entirely, putting the transitional regime at risk of hypocrisy, 
thereby threatening its moral and political status and, ultimately, its potential of success.180   
Third, the principle of legality is not unique to positivist conceptions of the law.  It is a 
function of other moral and political principles.  As Lon Fuller argues, legality is part of the essential 
internal morality of the law.181  The “rules” in “the rule of law” are the minimum standards necessary 
to achieve an ordered society.  Primary amongst these is a prohibition against ex post facto 
enforcement of criminal law.  To ignore this principal in practice would be to undermine the moral 
and practical goals of law and legal practice.  Thus, even if a transitional government is faced with a 
past regime that can, in no way, be regarded as legitimate, just, right, or moral, the new state is 
bound by its own commitment to the rule of law.182  To pursue a course of retroactive lawmaking 
would be symptomatic of the very legal pathology that the new state aspires to cure.183    
Finally, the legality principal is inextricably bound to core democratic and human rights 
values of autonomy and concomitant limitations on the use of state power.  The core interest 
represented by legality is fair warning.184  In order to justify coercion, a violation of autonomy, the 
law must provide fair warning.  Agents have a right to know, before hand, that their acts are 
punishable under the law.  If there is no law, or if the law is too vague and ambiguous, then it is not 
fair to punish an agent who had no warning that his actions would be punished.  Efforts by courts 
                                                 
180 FULLER, supra note 59, at 248-49.     
181 Fuller, Reply, supra note 137, at 650-57; FULLER, supra note 59, at 39, 248-249. 
182 FULLER, supra note 59, at 39, 248-249. 
183 Id.; Golding, supra note 58, at 182-87. 
184 FULLER, supra note 59, at 58; Golding, supra note 58, at 181-82.   
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or police to circumvent this principle undermine the very concept of the rule of law, which provides 
for the ultimate sovereignty of the law itself,185 particularly in transitional regimes.186   
The principle of legality comes down to a prohibition on retroactive enforcement of law.  
Agents under the law must be warned that their actions are at risk of punishment.  By definition, 
abuses in ancíen régimes were not under such a threat.  Thus, transitional courts cannot, out of 
respect for the principle of legality, punish pre-transitional bad acts insofar as they were consistent 
with the public face of law.  To conduct criminal trials in these conditions would be to violate a 
foundational principle of the rule of law.   
 
2. The positive potential of legality in transitions, a focus on public agency 
As is apparent in the foregoing discussion, the legality principle is concerned centrally with 
persons in their roles as legal agents.187  The principle points out that individuals are only subject to 
legal punishment in their statuses as legal agents.  This is importantly different from the often similar 
structures of moral blame inasmuch as the law plays a necessary role in constructing legal guilt.188  
Moreover, the principle points out that legal punishment is grounded in a presumption that those 
living under the law take account of law in their decision-making.  Thus, punishment is reserved 
exclusively for acts committed by persons in their public status as legal agents under the public face 
of law.  This is true for both consequentialist and deontological legal theories.   
                                                 
185 FULLER, supra note 59, at 157-162. 
186 Golding, supra note 58, at 180. 
187 James Bohman, Punishment as Political Obligation: Crimes Against Humanity and the Enforceable Right to Membership, 5 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. R. 551, 552-555 (2002). 
188 KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT, 25, 57-64 (2000) (originally published as DIE SCHULDFRAGE 
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Taking account for the role of legality in constructing legal agency and legal blame has 
important negative and positive consequences for transitional justice.  Negatively, taking seriously 
the role of public agency in constructing legal blame reaffirms the consequences of legality as an 
objection to broad criminal prosecutions in transitions.  The legality objection assumes this account 
of public agency in its prohibition against punishing violations of ex post facto law.  The principle of 
legality, and the concerns that underlie it, justify punishment by assuming that criminals were 
warned.189  Punishing in the absence of the warning either violates the moral autonomy of the 
accused190 or it is pointless,191 or both.   
As to the second, Oliver Wendell Holmes has famously argued that law is, by its nature, 
concerned only with effect, not moral culpability.192  His fellows and followers calculate punishment 
according to equations of deterrence and social cost.193  The publicly accessible agent is front and 
center in such theories.  Punishment is rational only inasmuch as it can, by threat, play a part in the 
decisions of those living under the law.  As H.L.A. Hart puts it, law is designed “to guide individuals’ 
choices as to behavior by presenting them with reasons for exercising choice in the direction of 
obedience.”194  “Reasons” here go beyond simple threats.  Law also serves an expressive function, 
publicly declaring what is right.195  In any event, punishing past acts based on novel shifts in the 
                                                 
189 ASHWORTH, supra note 137, at 86-87. 
190 Id. at 28-30, 86-87. 
191 IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 23 (1989). 
192 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1 HARV. L. R. 457, 459 (1897). 
193 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, [hereinafter Introduction] in THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 86 (Bowring, ed., 2002) [hereinafter WORKS]; Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Penal Law, 
[hereinafter Principles] in WORKS 365.  More recently, see Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76, 
J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COL. L. REV. 1193 (1985). 
194 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).   
195 PRIMORATZ, supra note 191, at 145-154; Hampton, supra note 69, at 208; DUFF, supra note 161, at  233-240; J. 
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public face of law is without purpose because the changes do not, by definition, have an impact on 
the legal agent in her pre-shift public mode and punishing based on pre-shift acts does not provide 
significant comparative benefit over punishment based on post-shift acts.196   
Taking note of the role of public agency highlighted by the legality principle also has positive 
import for consequentialist-oriented approaches to transitional justice.  By making public agents the 
objects of punishment, advocates of utilitarian legal theories depend on the possibility that those 
living under the law could act differently under a different public face of law.  Reflecting back to the 
principle of legality, the objection points out that former abusers might well act differently under the 
laws of a new state.  It would be inefficient, pointless, and ultimately unfair197 to assume otherwise.  
It follows that consequentialist law enforcement concerns, such as deterrence, are better served in 
transitional circumstances by focusing on post-transitional behavior.198 
Deontological constructions of legal wrong also invoke a public agent, suggesting negative 
and positive effects on transitional justice.  The legality principle is, as Jerome Hall points out, a 
solution to the problem of coercing autonomous agents.199  Treating another as an end, and not 
merely as a means, assumes that they had the relevant capacities and information to make a 
decision.200  Knowledge and intent are central in this model of agency.  Assigning blame and 
                                                 
196 This point is discussed at greater length in Section IV, infra. 
197 Holmes thought that the common law would “by the necessity of its nature” give up such words.  As it turns out, 
basic principles of fairness have become more entrenched with the prevalence of Rule Utilitarian decision procedures 
that adopt deontological standards for qualification to and utilitarian measures of punishment. See, e.g., Paul 
Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 19 (1987).  Holmes himself 
retains excuses for infants and for the insane because they are not able to participate as full public agents in their 
decisions.  So, while he may not approve of the term “fairness” sneaking into the conversation, it is clear that he 
would agree with the point in this context. 
198 This issue is explored at greater length in Section IV, infra. 
199 HALL, supra note 137, at 58-64. 
200 DUFF, supra note 161, at  20-39. 
An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming) 
 
31 
responsibility operates with the assumption that the accused can appreciate the wrongness of her 
actions.  Punishment is, thus, designed to reflect on the nature of the wrong, treating the criminal as 
an agent who has chosen her acts.  Owing to this account, Hegel argued that punishment is a right 
of the criminal, reflective of her autonomy.201  Reciprocally, if, an agent could not have known that 
her action was illegal, as distinct from simply wrong, then there is no ground to hold her criminally 
liable.202   
In a transitional context, trials violate the autonomy of agents cast in their public roles under 
the law by punishing them for actions that were not, in fact, against the public face of law 
propagated by the abusive regime.  Note that this does not extend to moral blame.  The legality 
excuse that I am proposing is exclusively a function of the split between moral and public agency 
and the corresponding division between moral and legal blame.203  The principle of legality provides 
a shield against legal punishment only.  There is plenty of room left over for assignments of moral 
blame and responsibility for repair and reform.204   
Beyond the deontological concern for treating individuals as ends, Kant is well-known for 
his assertion that law is a tool for solving the problem of justice among a race of devils.205  Even for 
Kant, then, law is, at least in part, a coercive tool, playing a role similar to that played in more purely 
consequentialist theories of criminal punishment.  Pointing out that devils should not be punished 
for failures of the public face of law is simply to say that it is both unjust and pointless to “make 
someone suffer a punishment unless the individual was given a fair warning that his act would bring 
                                                 
201 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, para. 100 (Knox, trans., 1952).  For an interesting critique of this argument see John 
Deigh, On the Right to be Punished: Some Doubts, 94 ETHICS 191 (1983/4). 
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it down on him.”206  My claim is not that abusers from the past would have acted differently if they 
had been living in a different legal culture; rather, the claim from legality is that it is unfair and 
inefficient to assume that they would not have.   
Trials, as opposed to private condemnation or moral blame, assume the existence of a legal 
prohibition in the construction of responsibility and the justification of punishment.  Understanding 
the agency significance of legality puts an important positive spin on objections to transitional trials 
derived from the legality principal.  Specifically, by recognizing the role of an abusive public face of 
law in pre-transitional abuses, transitional regimes can recognize not only the transitional potential 
of political, social, and legal reform, but also the transitional potential of individual abusers.  
Transitional jurisprudence must take normative account of this and design transitional procedures 
that reflect potential for change.  The legality objection is one result of this accounting.  As I argue 
in the remainder of this article, proper distribution of an excuse based on legality provides both a 
normative structure for hybrid programs of transitional justice and practical guidance for executing 
these programs in particular transitional circumstances.   
 
C. An Affirmative Excuse Based on Legality 
 Pre-transitional bad acts reflect an abusive public culture.  An abusive culture is, in turn, 
linked to broad complicity in abuses committed by and under pre-transitional regimes.  Broad 
complicity poses problems for justice in transitions both because of the large numbers of potential 
defendants and because it exposes deeper, more theoretical, problems for criminal trials in 
transitions posed by legality.  A transitional movement must sort through these problems if it hopes 
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to seek justice for past wrongs.  The key shift in thinking that I am motivating is a realization that 
these challenges do more than pose problems for programs of prosecution in transitions—they 
point out transitional differences that must be accounted for by transitional jurisprudence, not 
merely accommodated.207   
Since transitional justice is an exercise in non-ideal theory,208 a full accounting of these 
elements should provide some positive descriptive significance for a jurisprudential theory of 
transitional justice.  One key feature of transitions that must be accounted for is the fact that there is 
a transition.  Stable state justice is a matter of enforcing and further refining an operating vision of 
right.  In transitions, the vision itself is under construction.209  Complicity, legality, and other 
challenges to justice in transition serve practical and theoretical notice of the shift.210  The challenge 
for transitional justice is to find a way to address past wrongs that is consistent with the basic tenets 
of the rule of law, but takes principled account of the fact that there is a transition. 
Taking note of the connection between pre-transitional conditions and pre-transitional 
abuses on the one hand, and between transitional movements and commitments to alter the public 
face of law on the other indicates how this challenge can be met.  Advocates for criminal trials in 
transitions are rightly concerned about limitations on and objections to prosecutions because, as they 
see it, a transition that fails to prosecute all those implicated in past abuses compromises its duty to 
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do justice, though necessity may demand such a compromise.211  In my view, this is too drastic a 
conclusion.   
If the factors that impose limitations on criminal prosecutions describe unique conditions 
that have theoretical significance for transitional jurisprudence, then it is not the case that limited 
prosecutions are compromises against justice in transitions.  Quite the contrary, the point is that 
broad prosecutorial strategies are not “transitional.”  They are ill-considered attempts to recreate 
stable state justice in transitions that fail to take account of transitional realities and to capitalize on 
transitional opportunities.   
Recognizing the role of the public face of law in abusive states in light of transitional 
commitments to legality erases the apparent justice gap opened between the numbers of those 
implicated in past wrongs and the capacity of transitions to conduct criminal trials.  Broad complicity 
and correspondingly large numbers of potential defendants reflect the fact that publicly and 
institutionally approved practices and social norms fuel pre-transitional abuses.  Given that most of 
those who participated in pre-transitional abuses lived under an abusive public face of law, broad 
prosecution programs are not appropriate because most of those who would be prosecuted should 
not be, according to the principle of legality.  It is not merely that transitions cannot punish all of 
those implicated in past abuses; most of those implicated ought not to be punished. 
Legality concerns are best met, then, not by giving up on criminal trials altogether, but by 
determining who might qualify for an affirmative defense.  While the details of such an excuse would 
be context dependant, for purposes of advancing the conversation, I offer the following:   
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DEFENSE FROM LEGALITY 
1. It is an affirmative defense for the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense 
if the act reflects a reasonable interpretation of the prevailing public face of law.  “Public face of 
law” encompasses formal legislation, executive orders, the body of prevailing public threats, 
institutional expectations represented by institutional agents, and commonly represented public 
and legal expectations as they would have been perceived by a reasonable person in the actor’s 
condition and position at the time of his act. 
 
2. The legality defense is not available if: 
a. The act is not within the scope of expectations present in public face of law.212 
b. The act does not reflect the public demands on the claiming agent. 
c. The agent is not, himself or herself, subject to the relevant body of public law. 
d. The agent is directly responsible to another body of law and is not under direct threat from 
the body of public law that is claimed as the source of a defense.213 
e. The actor is under obligations that reflect a special status to which he or she has voluntarily 
submitted where this status is expected to supercede all other demands on his or her 
behavior.214 
 
Providing a defense to agents of pre-transitional abuse based on the legality principle 
performs the necessary practical and theoretical task of converting the unique characteristics that 
define pre-transitional abuses and transitions into normative conditions relevant to transitional 
justice-seeking.  Extension of the excuse recognizes that many, if not most, pre-transitional bad acts 
were committed by individuals who, given the nature of the public face of law under the abusive 
regime, were justified in believing that what they did was right, necessary, or at least not subject to 
legal punishment.   
                                                 
212 Sub-point (a) secures prosecutorial privilege in cases where agents move beyond the basic scope of the culture of 
abuse.  
213 Sub-points (b) and (c) clarify conditions of recognition for agents identified in sub-point (a), and provide independent 
ways to negate the defense where specific proof of motive cannot be produced.  
214 Sub-points (d) and (e) provide for prosecution of people in special positions that free them from the common 
demands of public law or explicitly require conduct above common public practice.  The focus of (d) is on leaders 
responsible to international treaties and covenants.  The interest in (e) is in individuals who have freely taken oaths of 
conduct that supercede their statuses as agents under public law.   
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Recognizing transitional commitments to the rule of law in this way also highlights the 
prospective nature of transitional justice.215  The function of trials in stable states is to reaffirm 
commitments to right established by law.216  Transitional justice is, in large part, a process of 
rejecting old commitments embodied in the abusive public face of law in order to establish new 
commitments to democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.217  Transitions are defined 
by the need to produce significant changes in public norms, practices, and consciousness in order to 
carry an abuse-ridden society into a new period characterized by commitments to human rights and 
the rule of law.218  Organizing transitional justice programs around recognition and extension of an 
excuse to individual actors serves these prospective transitional justice goals in a number of ways. 
First, it highlights the potential and necessity to transform citizens of an abusive regime into 
citizens of a post-transitional state.  The principle of legality is as much concerned with agents as 
laws.  The proposed excuse recognizes a distinction between individuals acting in a private versus a 
public mode.  Many of those who committed abuses in the past were acting in a public mode in ways 
that were, when the totality of pre-transitional public conditions is taken into account, theoretically 
predictable.  The fact of broad complicity points out that part of the process of justice in transitions 
is transforming norms.  The legality objection points out is that most of those complicit are 
candidates for change.   
Second, focusing on the role of public norms in abuses sets the stage for production of a full 
account of the past that allows a transitional movement to mark cites for change and publicly 
establish commitments to new norms.  Proper extension of the excuse requires establishment of a 
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clear historical record of the past in order to determine who should and who should not be excused 
and to further the necessary process of converting the old public face of law into the new.  Trials, on 
the other hand, run the risk of neglecting the fact that there is a transition. By trying to keep 
transitions in the mold of stable state criminal jurisprudence, trial advocates fail to take account of 
the fact that transitional justice must be both prospective and retrospective in ways that stable state 
justice is not.219 
 This proposed defense invites obvious objections, particularly when it is pointed out that 
abuses commonly violate the most basic tenets of civilized law.220  Concerns may also be raised as to 
the premium the excuse puts on the principle of legality.  Committed consequentialists might, for 
example, argue for rejection or suspension of the legality principle in favor of practical goals such as 
deterrence and incapacitation.  I address these concerns in the next two sections of this article.  
Building on this discussion, in the last section I suggest how transitional justice procedures can be 
“excuse-centered,” and how this approach provides justification, support, and guidance for truth 
commissions and other elements of the “hybrid” approach. 
 
III. DEFENDING THE DEFENSE PART 1: OTHER SOURCES OF LAW 
Section II argued against individual criminal liability in transitions by making use of the 
principle non malum sine lege, commonly called the legality principle.  This position may seem 
unattractive for a number of reasons.  Among these is that the legality objection, as I have developed 
it so far, seems to rely on a strictly positivist account of law.  A naturalist might object, arguing that 
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laws demand obedience as a function of their proximity to natural right, that state codes inconsistent 
with natural law cannot demand obedience, that natural law exists independently of state codes, and 
that natural law creates direct obligations regardless of conflicting state codes. 221   From this, a 
naturalist could conclude that everyone has a standing obligation to the natural law that is not 
excused by interference from immoral state codes of conduct.222  
This is an argument with some currency in transitional justice debates.223  It was, for 
example, used at Nuremberg224 and in the German border guard cases.225  Beyond this historical 
significance, this basic line of response, which appeals to a source of “law” outside of state codes, 
can be applied equally to justify punishment based on, for example, international law.  In this section 
I respond to this line of argument by motivating a distinction between legal culpability and moral 
responsibility that is based on epistemic duties unique to agents in their public versus private modes.  
I proceed by suggesting that the “strict liability” approach to blame suggested by the naturalist line 
does not account for the role that the public face of law plays in the lives of public agents.  I 
conclude, however, that the unique positions occupied by high-level leaders vis-à-vis international law 




                                                 
221 See generally, AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, passim; THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Chapters 14 and 15; SIR 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Introduction and Chapter 1.   
222 DUFF, supra note 161, at  75. 
223 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 14-15; P. NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE, 179, 246 (1999). 
224 The Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trial, a 1945 publication of the United States State Department, Office of International 
Information, at XVIII. 
225 Berlin State Court, No. (523) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91), in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, VOL. III, at 576; ELSTER, 
supra note 21, at 238-39 
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A.  Fears of Radical Skepticism 
I will grant, both for purposes of the argument and because I think it is true, that murdering 
thousands of innocents is wrong, even if no domestic laws recognize that it is so.226  My argument 
for an affirmative defense does not imply that there are not higher callings than laws on the books.227  
Neither does it imply that “bad” laws can demand obedience.228  My focus is on the fact that the 
public face of law in abusive states intervenes between individuals and moral right in such a way that 
reasonable people living in these regimes may make mistakes about what they ought and ought not 
to do.  Because the source of this confusion benefits from the apparent stamp of official state 
approval,229 is external to the agent, and is, by definition, removed in the process of transition, the 
legality principle points out that punishment is inappropriate.  That this is so implies neither that 
pre-transitional abuses were right nor that those implicated did not have a duty to know better and 
do otherwise.   
The naturalist objection is, at its core, fed by fear of a skepticism of duties to the good that 
my argument does not implicate.  To illuminate the point it is useful to consider the full extent of 
the naturalist critique by way of a discussion of excuse defenses.  Mistakes of fact generally provide 
an excuse from legal blame.230  Consider, for example, a hiker who, walking through a public forest, 
                                                 
226 I am hardly alone in this view.  See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Internal Realism, supra note 132  
(extending arguments appearing in Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (1996)). 
227 Hart, supra note 139 at 617-21.   
228 Id.; see also PLATO, APOLOGY, passim. 
229 This distinguishes the legality excuse as I am developing it from the more familiar excuse of ignorance of the law, 
which is not, in most circumstances, a viable defense against criminal liability, though it may mitigate culpability 
230 ASHWORTH, supra note 137, at 234-37; HALL, supra note 137, at 36-76. 
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unwittingly takes a path leading onto private property, thus committing the crime of trespass.231  
Unless this is a strict liability offense, the trespasser would not, and should not, be blamed for his 
trespass if he both did not know and could (or should) not have known that he was walking on 
private rather than public land.232   
The naturalist objection sees the legality defense as proposing a parity between mistakes of 
fact and mistakes of the good such that blameless errors of right should provide an excuse on par 
with mistakes of fact.  The argument proceeds from the premise that blameless moral ignorance is 
just as possible as blameless ignorance of facts.  There are really two ideas here.  The first is that 
moral ignorance is possible.  The second is that one can be blameless for these mistakes.  Sincere 
differences in moral belief provide ample proof of the first assertion.  While a relativist may look at 
such differences and claim that neither disputant is “mistaken,” the abuses perpetrated in pre-
transitional regimes provide examples of opinions that challenge the moral agnostic to stay 
neutral.233  The more interesting issue is, then, whether blame is appropriate when a wrongdoer acts 
in accord with a mistaken belief that what he is doing is right, or, at least, not wrong. 
The legality excuse I have proposed contends, without apparent limitation, that blame is not 
appropriate if bad acts are functions of social beliefs, practices, and norms.  While my proposed 
defense is not a cultural defense, there are some parallels that are worth considering in the face of 
the naturalist objection.  Consider, for example, a Hittite living in the Near East in 100 B.C.234  The 
                                                 
231 I take this example and the argument for radical skepticism from Gideon Rosen’s unpublished paper Responsibility and 
Moral Ignorance available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2001/readings/index.html.  Rosen presented this 
paper to the 2001 Philosophy Colloquium at New York University School of Law.  There Rosen made clear that this 
paper is an experiment and is not to be taken as representing his final thoughts on the subject of moral responsibility.   
232 J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in 1 ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS, LVII, 20 (1956-1957) (discussing duty to 
take reasonable care in order to avoid preventable ignorance).   
233 MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE LAW at 24-35 (1997). 
234 I borrow this example from Rosen, supra note 231. 
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Hittite would have been shaped by the ubiquitous practice of slavery and the commonly shared 
belief system that made slavery a perfectly acceptable practice.  He would, predictably and naturally, 
have grown up thinking that, while it was bad to be a slave, there is nothing inherently wrong with 
the practice of slavery.235   
Of course, it is one thing to claim that the Hittite did not know that slavery is wrong.  It is 
quite another to contend that this mistake is excusable.  To render the Hittite truly blameless for his 
mistake of right, it is necessary to contend that he did not breach a duty to “rethink the non-
controversial principles that form[ed] the framework for [his] relations with other people.”236  This 
included premise makes a claim about epistemic duty, what one has a duty to know in the context of 
norm-guided action.  The legality excuse raises concerns for the naturalist because it seems to 
endorse this added premise, asserting that duties to right begin and end with the duty to know what 
public norms require, no matter how evil or misguided those norms might be.  This is, of course, an 
uncomfortable proposition.     
 Fortunately, there are good reasons to doubt the veracity of the added premise.  Specifically, 
it seems to miss a significant distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of right.  Focusing 
on this distinction suggests that we may have duties to know our duties, epistemic duties, that go 
farther and are more demanding than is suggested by the quick switch from mistakes of fact to 
mistakes of the good.   Aristotle provides just such an argument in Nicomachean Ethics.237   
 
 
                                                 
235 The Hittite is not alone in this belief.  Aristotle, for example, famously argues for slavery on the basis of an ontology 
that includes natural slaves and natural masters.  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, I. 4-8. 
236 Rosen, supra note 231, at 12. 
237 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W.D. Ross, trans., 1925). 
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B. Mistakes About Particulars vs. Mistakes of the Good 
In Book III of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes aim at Plato’s claim that nobody does what 
is bad knowing that it is bad.238  Plato’s position is, in Aristotle’s view, tantamount to thinking that 
evil acts are not voluntarily committed.239  Adoption of such a view shatters intuitive notions of blame 
and praise by denying that anyone can be blamed for their evil acts.  Aristotle’s response attempts to 
reconstruct the possibility of blaming evildoers by distinguishing between mistakes of particulars and 
mistakes of right.  Aristotle writes: 
Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to 
abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and 
in general bad; but the term “involuntary” tends to be used not if a man is ignorant 
of what is to his advantage—for it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary 
action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men 
are blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and 
the objects with which it is concerned.  For it is on these that both pity and pardon 
depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these, acts involuntarily.240 
  On this view, ignorance that may pardon is not of right and wrong, but ignorance of critical 
exigent facts and circumstances that thwart an individual’s ability to achieve the intended 
consequences of her actions.  Bad acts perpetrated in the fog of ignorance of particulars are 
excused241 because the action is truly involuntary.  To use one of Aristotle’s examples, if Metrope 
had known that the figure looming in the darkness was not an enemy soldier but his son, then he 
would not have shot.  Due to this mistake, Metrope cannot be said to have voluntarily shot his son.  
                                                 
238 PLATO, MENO at 77 c-e. Plato’s position, like the ignorance line attributed to legality above, is grounded in the claim 
that those who commit evil acts do so out of ignorance, simply mistaking the bad for the good.  While Plato’s 
position is much broader, he does not distinguish between blameless and blameworthy mistakes of right, it is 
analytically close enough to the legality line to make Aristotle’s response worth considering in the present context. 
239 This is, as we will see, importantly different from “involuntary.”  On Aristotle’s view, only acts that are involuntary 
qualify for an excuse. 
240 ARISTOTLE, supra note 237, at III, 1. 
241 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1963). 
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His involuntary mistake of fact qualifies him for pity, for his mistake and the loss of his son, not 
blame.   
 Ignorance of right and wrong is, as Aristotle points out, quite different from ignorance of 
particulars.  Failing to seek out and know the nature of good will certainly lead to bad acts done by 
reason of ignorance.  Unlike Metrope’s mistake, however, these are errors of evaluation.  
Perpetrators of such acts can only be called “wicked.”  The wicked actor intends both act and 
outcome, though she mistakes bad for good.242  If a wicked person who has intentionally done 
wicked things cannot be blamed, it is hard to see who can be. 
 This distinction has obvious application to the legality excuse that I have proposed.  
Consider the case of a Hutu who engages in genocide because he truly believes what the public face 
of law tells him, that the Tutsi “cockroaches” must be exterminated.243  According to my discussion 
of legality, true believers of this ilk should qualify for an excuse because the beliefs that they acted 
upon are traceable to an abusive public face of law.  On Aristotle’s view, the Hutu’s mistake is a 
mistake of evil for good.  He is, then, wicked.  The wicked deserve blame, not pity.  So, on 
Aristotle’s argument, the Hutu’s ignorance does not excuse his act because the ignorance is an 
expression of bad character.244  This claim for responsibility in transitions is bolstered by the fact 
that in abusive states there are those who recognize the evil around them and actively work against 
it.245  If it is not impossible to know right from wrong in an abusive state then there seems no reason 
                                                 
242 ARISTOTLE, supra note 237, at III, 1. 
243 Though contested by the defendants in the “Media Trial,” the ICTR held that “cockroach” is the appropriate 
translation of “inyenzi,” which was used to refer to Tutsi’s during the periods leading up to and including the 1994 
holocaust in Rwanda.  See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, No. ICTR-99-52-T, para. 171 (Dec. 3, 2003). 
244 ARISTOTLE, supra note 237, at III, 1.  As a further test, Aristotle points out that “the doing of an act that is called 
involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be painful and involve repentance.”   
245 See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 110-144 (describing the efforts of Paul Rusesabagina, manager of the Hôtel 
des Mille Collines, to provide safe haven for Tutsis during the 1994 holocaust). 
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to not hold responsible and punish those who fail to live up to their ethical duty to know right from 
wrong.  
 Aristotle’s arguments seem to provide grounds for a devastating attack on the excuse I have 
proposed.  As it stands, the legality excuse appears to shift blame for bad acts, via bad character, to 
an abusive public face of law.  By focusing on a distinction between ignorance of particulars and 
ignorance of the good and corresponding differences in epistemic duty, Aristotle seems to have 
destroyed the premise that individuals have no duty to inquire beyond the claims of right present to 
them in the form of the public face of law.246  Thereby, it seems appropriate to blame pre-
transitional abusers even if they act from real ignorance that corresponds to the public face of law.  
They are wicked, after all.247 
 
C. Legality and the Epistemic Role of Law in Public Agency 
 The Aristotelian/Naturalist line of attack misses the critical role, highlighted by the legality 
principle, that the state plays in constructing legal responsibility.  In abusive regimes, the public face 
of law is such that reasonable people can conclude that what they are doing is, at least, not against 
the law.  Focusing on this feature of pre-transitional regimes suggests two responses to the natural 
law objection bolstered by Aristotle’s distinction.  First, the state must, in transition, accept some 
responsibility for the ignorance producing conditions that existed under the old regime.  Second, the 
disjunction between law and moral right in abusive regimes highlights a distinction between private 
                                                 
246 A similar argument can be made from Jean-Paul Sartre’s argument for radical responsibility.  JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, 
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS, Chap. 2, Part 1.  On first flush, the excuse I have proposed may, in Sartre’s terms, seem 
like the worst sort of “bad faith.”  The distinction that I press in this section, between moral responsibility and legal 
liability, provides a response to Sartre just as it does to Aristotle and the naturalist.   
247 PRIMORATZ, supra note 191, at 75-79. 
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moral agency and public legal agency.  Taking this into account suggests that, at least as a practical 
matter, a distinction between moral culpability and legal liability should be made in transitions.248  
This approach preserves the possibility of moral blame but, by forgoing legal punishment, 
appreciates the commitment to fair-warning that girds the legality principle.   
Aristotle’s defense of moral responsibility comes down to an argument that we each have an 
unmediated duty to know our duty.  While this position may be sustainable, it does not properly 
apply in the legal context.  To see how this is so, it is important to focus on the conditions that 
create excusable ignorance.  Even for Aristotle, ignorance of particulars is not a complete defense.249  
We each have a basic responsibility to know facts and conditions that a reasonable person in our 
position would know.  Ignorance produced by laziness and inattention is not excusable.  Agents are 
excused, however, for “ignorance for which they are not, themselves, responsible.”250  If our 
ignorance is a result of deception or misinformation from another source then we may not be to 
blame when this ignorance leads us to do harm. Despite this admission, Aristotle stands firmly by 
his claim that “wickedness is voluntary”251 and not to be excused, no matter, it seems, the role that 
external conditions might play. 
These positions may seem somewhat at odds.  The solution, which is resident in Aristotle’s 
argument, is that agents have different levels of epistemic duty with respect to particulars on the one 
hand and the good on the other.  Specifically, what Aristotle must argue is that, as autonomous and 
reflective beings, moral agents have the capacity and, thus, the duty, to discover directly the moral 
truth on their own.  While conditions in the world may affect moral knowledge, the external world 
                                                 
248 JASPERS, supra note 188, at 25-27, 45-64. 
249 ARISTOTLE, supra note 237, at III, 1. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
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does not mediate between agents and the good.  Therefore, conditions in the world cannot waive 
duties to know the good.   
 Knowledge of particulars, by contrast, can only be gained through our senses.  By virtue of 
this fact, conditions in the world directly mediate between the truth about particulars and knowledge 
of particulars.  Agents do not, then, have exclusive control over their knowledge of particulars.  In 
Metrope’s case, for example, the play of light and shadows, conditions of the world that he could 
not control, led to his mistaking his son for an enemy soldier.252  It follows that agents cannot be 
kept to the same stringent epistemic duties that hold with respect to the nature of the good.  For 
knowledge of particulars, the highest reasonable epistemic duty is the duty to take care.253  For 
knowledge of the good, the duty is absolute. 
  I agree that wicked people who do wicked things should be blamed.  I agree that pre-
transitional abusers, wicked people indeed, should be subject to blame.  I maintain, however, that 
they should not be subjected to legal punishment.  To see how I can hold both views it is critical to 
focus on the limited impact of the affirmative excuse I am proposing.  The legality excuse does not 
propose to exonerate wrongdoing or to shift epistemic duties entirely.   Provision of the excuse does 
not imply that no wrong has been done or that those implicated in pre-transitional abuses should 
not have acted otherwise.  It is a legal excuse derived from the failure of a regime to provide fair 
warning of the legal consequences of an action.  The excuse focuses on the privilege to punish and 
the conditions that a state must meet in order to claim this privilege.  It points out that if a state fails 
to meet its burden then it must forgo its privilege to punish.  Pre-transitional states fail to meet 
burdens of fair warning.  It follows that a transitional regime, as heir to the past, must provide a legal 
                                                 
252 Id.  
253 Id.  
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excuse for those who acted within the behavioral boundaries established by an abusive public face of 
law. 
Responses to legality concerns that focus on individual responsibility, such as those 
attributed to Aristotle and the Naturalist here, indulge in a non sequitur.  The failure of a state to fulfill 
the formal requirements that it must in order to claim the privilege to punish is separable from 
concerns relating to ethical duties to know right from wrong and moral obligations to act 
appropriately.  A state’s duty to inform its citizens about what the law requires also has epistemic 
consequences.   The legality principle proscribes that fair warning is a prerequisite to just 
punishment.254  What the principle highlights is that, from a criminal law point of view, the state 
necessarily mediates between the natural law and citizens.  It may well be the case that a state that 
fails in its duty to conform state law to the natural law does not deserve faith and respect.255  It may 
even be true that there is no obligation to obey bad law so that state law that is contrary to the 
natural law cannot bind citizens.256  None of this implies, however, that a state that propagates an 
abusive public face of law is morally entitled to punish citizens who obey just because that law does 
not conform to the natural law.  Such would be both “brutal” and “absurd.”257   
 The state is a conduit for knowledge of right and wrong within the pathway of criminal 
justice leading up to prosecution and punishment.  Therefore, while citizens may have the capacity 
and bear the duty to know the good on an individual basis, there can be no criminal consequence for 
failure to fulfill this epistemic duty.258  The only epistemic duty that can have criminal consequences 
                                                 
254 HALL, supra note 137, at 58-59. 
255 Hart, supra note 139 at 618; Fuller, Reply, supra note 137, at 657-61. 
256 Hart, supra note 139 at 616-17. 
257 FULLER, supra note 59, at 59. 
258 Hart, supra note 139 at 619-20. 
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is the duty to know what the public face of law demands.259  Where, as in abusive states, the public 
face of law creates conditions in which reasonable people can be led to make mistakes about what is 
right, those who act out those mistakes cannot be held criminally accountable without violating 
legality260 because they have met their public legal duty by knowing what the law demands.  They 
may be blamed for their moral failures, but they may not, consistent with core demands of the rule 
of law, be punished criminally.261  Reciprocally, the regime that has enabled that mistake loses its 
moral entitlement to punish.262   
 None of this is inconsistent with praising those who rise above the abusive conditions of a 
pre-transitional state.  We can, and should, celebrate the Oskar Schindlers of the world.  That we do, 
however, does not require that we punish those who follow the law.  Legal wrong is not the same as 
wickedness.  The state bears responsibility for defining legal wrong and for establishing conditions 
consistent with legal education and habituation of citizens.  Given this duty, citizens may, in their 
public roles as legal agents, rely on the public face of law as the standard bearer of legal right and 
wrong.  When the state fails to do its part, the legality principle dictates that the state must sacrifice 
its privilege of punishment in deference to fairness and respect for the autonomy of its citizens.  For 
a transitional regime to do otherwise would put it in no better a moral position than its 
predecessor.263   
 The excuse I have proposed is limited to legal agents in their public modes.  It has no 
footing in and no consequences for moral agency.  Moral blame may still be appropriate for the 
                                                 
259 Consistent with this view, mistakes of law generally do not provide an excuse from legal punishment. 
260 Id. 
261 The distinction proposed here between legal and moral punishment is not new.  For its application in the context of 
transitional justice, however, credit is due to JASPERS, supra note 188.   
262 Fuller, Reply, supra note 137, at 652-57. 
263 Id. at 657-61; FULLER, supra note 59, at 39, 248-249. 
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knowing commission of any act that is wrong.264  A morally blameworthy act may also have legal 
consequences, but this need not be the case.  In a similar vein, morally appropriate acts may 
sometimes be subject to criminal consequences.  There is, as a practical matter, no necessity in this 
relationship265 and so, no legal right to punish may be drawn from morality alone.  
 The legality principle respects the distinction between legal and moral blame by marking a 
derivative distinction between individuals in their public legal mode and agents in their private moral 
modes.  People, in their roles as legal agents, are operated on by the laws, which make claims on 
their behavior.  Legal agency comes with its own obligations and epistemology.  Legal punishment 
pursues those who fail in their duties as legal agents.  Punishment is forgone when agents meet the 
demands placed on them in public, despite the fact that they lie to their mothers about taking the 
garbage out.  The legality principle points out that the same argument goes for all other acts that are 
not prohibited under the law.  Actions mala in se, like acts mala prohibita, are punishable only if they 
are prohibited by law.  That they are wrong regardless of the law is beside the point.  
 
D. Justification and Application  
 This position is consistent with a familiar distinction, made in all rule ordered practices, 
between justification and application.266  Games, for example, operate with a specific set of rules.  
From time-to-time some of these rules may reveal themselves to be less than ideal with respect to 
the greater goals of the game.  Movements develop and opportunities to change the rules are 
presented.  These opportunities are limited to times and places outside of actual games, however.  
                                                 
264 Id. at 25, 26. 
265 AUSTIN, supra note 171, at 184. 
266 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 19-112 (Ciaran P. Cronin, 
trans., 1994). 
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Therefore, if a striker in a soccer match is called offside she might appeal the accuracy of the call but 
it would not be appropriate for her to appeal the fairness of the offside rule.  In the game, the rules 
are applied.  Conversations about their justification are reserved for other times and forums.   
 Law is similar to games in recognizing a firm distinction between justification and 
application.267  The principle of legality is an expression of this commitment.  The debate over the 
source of law and the legitimacy of law is part of the broader conversations that rationalize, justify, 
and, eventually, generate laws.268  They are the sorts of conversations engaged in by legislators, policy 
wonks, citizens, and sometimes even philosophers, and are reserved for the senate floor, classrooms, 
and civil society.  Fetal norms that have not completed their gestation do not, until fully mature as 
sanctioned law, justify punishment.   
 To illustrate the point, imagine that I am driving at 34 m.p.h. on a stretch of road that is 
clearly marked as a 35 m.p.h. zone.  When pulled me over and charged with speeding I contest, 
claiming that I was within the marked speed limit.  Now imagine that the officer agrees.  He adds, 
however, that this is his usual patrol and he has noticed an unacceptable number of fatal accidents 
on this road.  Furthermore, his department has conducted a study, the conclusion of which is clear: 
if cars traveling that stretch of road drove at 25 m.p.h. dozens of lives would be saved every year.  
Thus, he says, the speed limit really, by all measures, practical and moral, should be 25 m.p.h.  He 
writes me a ticket for going 9 m.p.h. over the correct—not the posted—speed limit. 
 Now we go to court.  The officer acknowledges that I was within the posted limit, but 
presents the judge with the findings of the study.  Intrigued, the court conducts an evidentiary 
hearing, finds in favor of the patrolman, and fines me for driving faster than I should have.  In my 
                                                 
267 HABERMAS, supra note 161, at 115, 172. 
268 Id. 
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appeal, my argument is clear: the judge and the patrolman overstepped their bounds.  It was their 
job to apply the law as they found it.  By overstepping, they have created a Kafkaesque world of 
inscrutable legal expectations.269  They have also unjustly used the law to punish me for an act that 
was not, by definition, illegal at all. 
 It would still be unjust for the judge to punish me for speeding in this case if I revealed that 
I had read the study before that fateful evening.  It would be unjust even if I agreed with the study, 
and thought that everyone should drive 25 m.p.h.  Even if all of this were true, the laws on the 
books set the limit at 35 m.p.h.  More importantly, the signs on the road clearly read “Speed Limit: 
35 m.p.h.”  My duty as a legal agent was, then, to respect that 35 m.p.h. limit.  So long as I have 
done this, I am guilty of no legal transgression, even if, in a moment of private reflection, I agree 
that I should have kept it under 25 m.p.h.   
 The same is true of someone who abided by the laws in place under an abusive regime.  
Brought before a transitional tribunal he may, rightly, claim that he was following the law at the 
time.  It would be odd and out of place for the judge to respond by saying that those were bad laws 
and the defendant should have known better.  Just as it is not a defense in law to claim that the law 
is wrong,270 there cannot be a legal obligation to ignore or break laws that go against moral law.  This 
is not to say that there is no moral obligation to disobey evil laws.  As Socrates argues in the 
Apology, there is.271  In a more contemporary vein, under United States law, those who claim 
objective fear of future persecution may not gain asylum if they participated in persecution of 
                                                 
269 More than most applications, “Kafkaesque” is singularly appropriate here.  In Kafka’s THE TRIAL, K confronts a 
situation similar to that I am describing here.  The duty of clear warning that is captured by the legality principle is 
meant to guard against the specter that Kafka constructs.   
270 PLATO, CRITO, passim. 
271 PLATO, APOLOGY, passim. 
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another,272 even if under duress.273  By contrast, while applicants may not normally claim fear of 
persecution based on threats of lawful punishment in their home countries,274 if the law violated 
demanded participation in persecution, then fear of punishment based on a refusal to participate can 
provide a basis for asylum.275  This apparent disparity is explained by the fact that duress is a legal 
excuse, not a moral justification;276 and “asylee” is a moral, not legal, status.277  Denial of asylum to 
an applicant who has, under duress, participated in the persecution of others, is acceptable because it 
is a function of moral culpability, not legal liability.278 
 Legal liability is different from moral culpability.  The legality principle marks this 
distinction, recognizing that, while private moral considerations may be relevant to the justification 
of law and to private decisions to obey or not, these private reflections do not provide warrant for 
public sanction.  Absent preexisting and legitimate, if not just, public threats, states lose their 
privilege to punish.  None of this, as I discuss further in the last section of this article, excludes 
advancement of various forms of private guilt.  Nor, as I argue in the next sub-section, does it 
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E. International Law: Distinguishing High-Level Leaders from those Excused 
To now, I have focused on responses that refer to natural law or the demands of moral 
right.  Those interested in prosecuting present-day abusers need not rely on such abstractions.  Our 
contemporary international human rights culture279 boasts a well-stocked toolbox of treaties, 
charters, and jurisprudence of crimes against humanity and jus cogens law, each of which may serve as 
touchstones for transitional trials.280  In this section, I argue that these sources do not provide 
warrant to prosecute those who live under an abusive public face of law, but do provide ground for 
prosecuting high-level leaders exposed directly to threats of punishment under international law.  
Crimes against humanity have been in the toolbox since at least the seventeenth century,281  
but came into prominent use at Nuremberg.282  The Nuremberg Tribunals determined that 
unconditional surrender entitled the Allies to establish criminal laws ex post facto.283  This position, 
which smacks of “might makes right,” is only persuasive, if at all, on a practical level.  Contemporary 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity need not rely on this dubious ground, of course.  Going 
forward, the Nuremberg prosecutions established the international threat of punishment for crimes 
against humanity.284   
Appeals to crimes against humanity seem to solve legality concerns by replacing fuzzy 
presumptions of universal right with solid claims of international law grounded in historical events 
                                                 
279 Rorty, supra note 30 at 115-16. 
280 Cassel, supra note 211, at 197; Ortenlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2546-96. 
281 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Ch. 10 (1625); Emerich de Vattel, THE LAW OF MEN 232-33 
(1758); Richard Zouche, Iuris et Iudicii Fecialis, Sive, Iuris Inter Gentes, et Quaestionum de Eodem Explicatio (1650), in THE 
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1911). 
282 Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trial, supra note 224, at XVIII. 
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and institutions, including prosecutions at Nuremberg, the International Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia285 and Rwanda,286 and, going forward, the International Criminal Court.287  With slave 
trading and piracy, crimes against humanity also form the traditional core of universal jurisdiction,288 
allowing foreign states to pursue prosecutions where transitional regimes are not able or willing.289  
In light of recent prosecutions, pursued by individual states290 and by international tribunals, crimes 
against humanity appear to provide both normative justification for transitional prosecutions and a 
standing threat of punishment that persists where domestic laws enable abuse.   
 The duty and privilege of punishing crimes against humanity falls not on a particular power 
but on humanity as a whole.291  Just as sovereign states committed to the rule of law must earn the 
privilege to punish, so too, any authority that seeks to prosecute crimes against humanity must 
demonstrate that it has earned this right.  Members of the international community assert the 
privilege based on previous enforcement efforts and on consistent defense of core human rights 
norms.292  While compelling as a vision, this response to legality concerns fails to provide substantial 
ground for punishing those who live under an abusive public face of law.   
                                                 
285 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
286 Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3-4, Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994). 
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While crimes against humanity represent a critical advance in international human rights law, 
their presence on the international scene does not solve legality concerns in the unique 
circumstances of abusive states, at least for those living under an abusive public face of law.  To 
meet core legality concerns of clarity, regular enforcement, and fair warning, the threat of 
prosecution for violations of crimes against humanity must be present to those on the ground in 
abusive regimes.  Otherwise, crimes against humanity have no more normative significance with 
respect to legality than remote laws of foreign states or laws propagated in secret.  Unfortunately, for 
most living under pre-transitional regimes, international law, including crimes against humanity, is 
obscured by the local and immediate demands of an abusive public face of law. 
Just as abusive regimes operate to obscure the demands of natural right, so do they hide 
from domestic view the threats and demands of international law.293  This has two consequences.  
First, as heir to abusive regimes, transitional governments have no more moral authority to punish 
based on international law than natural law.  Second, abusers living under an abusive public face of 
law, because insulated from the body of threats maintained by the international community, are not 
subject to the fair warning required by legality.  Absent the coherent, clear warning demanded by 
legality, members of the international community have no better claim to punish crimes against 
humanity than do domestic authorities.  That the failure is the regime’s, rather than the international 
community’s, is neither here nor there with respect to the autonomy of prospective defendants.   
Leaders are situated differently.  Rather than living under an abusive public face of law, high-
level leaders have a duty to conform domestic law to the demands of natural right and to the core 
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demands of international human rights law.294  While failing to fulfill this duty does not give rise to 
individual criminal liability,295 recognition of this institutional role points out the unique position of 
high-level leaders.  As opposed to their subjects, leaders are exposed directly to the international 
community.  They may not claim ignorance of or insulation from threats of punishment posed by 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity.  That the vast majority of these prosecutions have 
focused on high-level leaders296 strengthens the threat, and the point.  So, while the historical fact of 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity does not solve legality concerns with respect to those 
living under an abusive regime; it provides ample authority for prosecuting high-level leaders who 
use their positions of authority to construct and preserve a public face of law that encourages crimes 
against humanity.297 
Jus cogens and international treaties face similar limitations, derived from externality298 and the 
intervention of domestic law.  In addition, they face significant jurisprudential problems.  Jus cogens, 
“norm[s] accepted and recognized by the international community of States,”299 for example, are 
only enforceable by states against other states and do not provide grounds for individual criminal 
liability.300  The few international treaties that provide grounds for individual liability usually require 
                                                 
294 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, art. 26, 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Convention on the Prevention and 
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domestic execution.  While it is argued that some treaties are not so limited,301 this is a contested 
view,302 diffusing any clear warning that the Genocide treaty, for example, might provide for those 
living within the dense folds of an abusive regime.  Regardless, even self-executing treaties are 
obscured in pre-transitional regimes by an abusive public face of law.   
High-level leaders in abusive regimes have good reason to question their commitments to 
death and destruction.  Since 1948 most countries, including most abusive regimes, have made 
formal commitments to refrain from atrocities by becoming parties to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other treaties and conventions.303  In addition to these documents, leaders have 
become regular targets for prosecutions based on transgressions of international law.304  These 
commitments provide the elite with adequate warning that they may be subjected to prosecution 
under international law.  This warning, unique to the normative and phenomenal positions of high-
level leaders, resolves legality concerns, which, I have argued, counsel against prosecutions directed 
against those who live under an abusive public face of law.  
 The significance of the distinction between subjects and sovereigns is amplified by the fact 
that abusive regimes are frequently autocratic.  There are relatively few people in influential decision-
making roles who are responsible for advancing institutional programs of abuse.305  Moreover, those 
most responsible are often identifiable by the fact that they have authored and executed the key 
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elements of an abusive public face of law.306  Having done so, leaders in these positions cannot use 
as a shield the sword that they have forged. 
 
IV. DEFENDING THE DEFENSE PART 2: CONSEQUENTIALIST RESPONSES TO LEGALITY 
To now this article has focused on deontological issues.  This discussion has largely ignored 
approaches to the problem of just punishment that focus not on abstract principles but on the 
achievement of social goals, such as prevention of crime.  In this consequentialist world, it might be 
argued that the principle of legality can and should be rejected or modified if it interferes with the 
efficient achievement of these goals.307  In this section, I argue that these concerns suggest a 
program of limited prosecutions focused on high-level leaders as a solution to problems of 
transitional justice.   
 Consequentialist approaches to criminal punishment are goal oriented.308  For the most part 
they are, as Nigel Walker puts it, reductive:309 they seek to reduce crime.  There are, in the traditional 
literature, five main services that trials and punishment provide to this end: 
1. Deterring the offender with painful memory of prior punishment 
2. Deterring others, using the punished as an example 
3. Reforming the offender so that she is less inclined to commit crimes 
4. Educating the offender and the public to take a more serious view of the criminal act 
5. Protecting the public by incapacitating the offender310 
                                                 
306 Id. 
307 I am in debt to Richard Kraut for his vigorous pursuit of this critical line. 
308 PLATO, PROTAGORAS at 324ab. 
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 These justifications are replicated in transitional justice debates.  For example, Douglass 
Cassel argues for domestic and international criminal trials in order to deter present and potential 
human rights violators.311  Others argue that trials can aid in carrying a transition forward,312 in part 
by demonstrating a public commitment to democracy and the rule of law.313  By deterring and by 
educating, trials also hope to decrease human rights abuses.314  In addition, the goal of incapacitation 
may justify transitional trials in order to prevent future abuses or counterrevolution.   
This section argues that consequentialist goals of incapacitation and deterrence do not 
support the use of criminal trials in transitions, at least for those who qualify for the proposed 
affirmative defense.  Most pre-transitional abusers, living under the immediate control of an abusive 
regime and an abusive public face of law, are unlikely to be deterred by remote threats of 
punishment.315  Further, given the shifts in law occasioned by transition, most pre-transitional 
abusers are best treated as candidates for change.  For those who are not, transitional regimes have 
authority to punish post-transitional crimes.  Consistent with previous sections, I maintain that high-
level leaders and others with direct exposure to the international community may be punished in 
order to deter those in similar positions in other abusive regimes.  Though I continue to argue 
against broad prosecutions, I leave room for procedural approaches that focus on reform and 
rehabilitation by arguing that most pre-transitional “offenders” are candidates for participation in 
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the broader reforms that constitute transitions.  Pursuit of reform and reintegration come at the 
price of withdrawing the threat of punishment in most cases, however.   The section concludes that, 
by coordinating limited trials and truth seeking procedures, it is possible to avoid most of the 
dangers of uncritical, de facto, amnesties while securing efficiently the transitional benefits that 
advocates hope to achieve through criminal trials and punishment. 
 
A. Deterring Future Human Rights Abusers 
 Deterrence theories focus on the decision-making processes of prospective criminals.316  
Transitional trials motivated by deterrence attempt to create an environment in which the balance of 
threatened punishment and provisional benefits tilts firmly against abuses.317  Transitional trials may 
also hope to deter by publicizing the facts of past abuses,318 lifting the veil of secrecy upon which 
abusers frequently rely.319  Finally, trials may hope to deter other potential human rights abusers 
abroad.320  The deterrent effect of truth and punishment on the international scene is a central 
argument in favor of an international criminal court and for international jurisdiction.321   
This section makes two main arguments against transitional trials as a deterrent strategy.  
First, criminal prosecutions are theoretically and practically unlikely to provide significant deterrent 
                                                 
316 Johs Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966); CESARE BECCARIA, OF 
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318 Cassel, supra note 311, at 78. 
319 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 662. 
320 This was an argument made in favor of prosecuting Augusto Pinochet.  See, Lorna McGregor, Military and Judicial 
Intervention: The Way Forward in Human Rights Enforcement?, 12 Ind. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 107, 117 (2001); AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, UNITED KINGDOM: THE PINOCHET CASE-UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND THE ABSENCE OF 
IMMUNITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AI Index EUR 45/01/99, 20 (1999). 
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effect against future institutionalized human rights abuses.322  Second, to the extent that future 
abuses can be deterred, transition itself, including shifts in social norms and public threats, provides 
sufficient threat to prevent future abuses.  The force of this argument is derived from the contention 
that deterrence justifications, though initially appealing, fail to take account of pre-transitional 
conditions, the places of individual abusers in pre-transitional states, and the impact that transitions 
themselves may be expected to have on victims and abusers.   
Jeremy Bentham describes the concept behind deterrence theory, often called as the “classic 
school” of criminology, thus: 
Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action.  When a man perceives or 
supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner 
as tends, with a certain force, to draw him, as it were, from the commission of that 
act. If the apparent magnitude, or rather value, of the pain be greater than the 
apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the 
consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it.  The 
mischief which would have ensued from the act, if performed, will also by that 
means be prevented.323  
The concept is not difficult to grasp.  If the consequences of an action are more bad than good for 
an agent, then she will refrain.  Deterrence as a justification of and goal for public policy is 
somewhat more complex, of course.  Bentham’s formula simplifies the conditions in which crimes 
are committed, and the subjective positions of criminals.324  It presumes that potential criminals are 
rational utility maximizers.325  It also assumes a single, identifiable, and univocal punitive authority.326  
It further assumes that the authority’s demands can be and are clearly communicated to agents.327  
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Finally, it simplifies the concept of “consequences,” which are a function of punishment and degree 
of certainty, the latter being divisible into risk of detection and risk of the consequence obtaining.328  
All of these considerations make the deterrence thesis much more complex than it first appears.  To 
measure the potential of criminal trials in transitions to prevent future abuses of human rights it is 
necessary to expose and investigate these complexities. 
Deterrence theory makes law and criminal punishment a strategic game between rational 
agents disposed to maximize the possibility of benefit and minimize risk of harm.329  The game 
leaves open the question of who the players are, however.  In transitions the subjective conditions 
that affect participation in deterrence games are more numerous and the possible identities of 
players more diverse than in stable states.330  Deterrence advocates usually fail to take proper account 
of these added complexities.  However, it is essential to be clear about who is deterring whom to 
understand the dynamic relationships in the game.331  Absent this, the hopeful claims of deterrence 
are too abstract to justify criminal punishment in transitions given the significant costs of trials in 
respect of other transitional goals. 
 
 
B. A Three Dimensional Analysis of Deterrence in Transitions 
                                                 
328  Aukerman, supra note 4, at 64.  In formulaic terms:  Deterrence = Severity of Consequence x (Risk of Detection x 
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330 Elster, Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of Justice in the Transition to Democracy, 39 EUR. J. SOC. 7, 37 
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 This section describes a three-dimensional model of deterrence in transitions, taking account 
of those who might be deterred, their subjective motivations, and the source of deterrent threats.  
The next section argues, based on this model, that only high-level leaders provide reasonable objects 
for deterrence in transitions. 
 
1. The first dimension: objects of deterrence 
In traditional deterrence theory, punishment is designed to have either an individual or a 
general deterrent effect.332  In the former, punishment tries to imprint the cost of crime on the 
criminal herself, using her memory of the punishment to deter her from committing future crimes.333  
General deterrence hopes that public punishment of criminals will put fear in the hearts of others 
and, thereby, prevent them from breaking the law.334  In transitions, advocates also justify 
punishment as a tool for preventing counter-revolutions335 by marking a change in the public face of 
law and deterring those who oppose transition.336  Punishment also aspires to create an environment 
of accountability where before there was impunity.337  
Individual transitions to democracy are not isolated.  They are part of broader efforts to 
establish and extend a human rights culture.338  Punishing in a particular transition may, then, have a 
                                                 
332 I take these terms from Andenaes, supra note 316, at 949, and Johs Andenaes General Prevention--Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. 
CRIM. L., C. & P.S., 176 (1952). 
333 Nigel Walker, Reductivism as Deterrence, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 326, at 212. 
334 For a vivid account of this theory in action see Michel Foucault’s description of the drawing and quartering of a 
“regicidaire” in the Introduction of DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977).  The theme of deterrence by raw fear and 
spectacle is repeated in more detail in “The Spectacle of the Gallows.”   
335 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 65. 
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“super-general” deterrent effect, discouraging current or prospective abusers in other states.339  Of 
course, to make the case for punishment on the basis of a “super-general” deterrence effect, there 
must be compelling reason to believe that a domestic spectacle will reach across lines of history, 
culture, and nationality.  If this hope is too thin then advocates must accept limitations on trials 
derived from other practical and moral considerations. 
 
2. The second dimension: sources of deterrence 
Transitions also leave open the question of who should take responsibility for creating the 
deterrent threat.340  In stable states the answer to this question is obvious: the right of punishment is 
reserved for a sovereign authority.341  In transitions, however, the candidates are more numerous, 
including an outgoing government, a provisional government or successor regime, the United 
Nations, regional transnational organizations,342 special tribunals, and a permanent international 
criminal court.  More recently, third party states have also made efforts to conduct trials.  Spain’s 
attempt to extradite Augusto Pinochet on charges of crimes against humanity is, perhaps, the most 
notorious;343 but Belgium was the first to enjoy contemporary success in these endeavors, when, in 
                                                 
339 Cassel, supra note 211, at 205-215; Jennifer Balint, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 45. 
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2001, several individuals connected to the 1994 Rwandan massacre were convicted in Belgian 
courts.344   
These possibilities suggest nine model cases that deterrence advocates might have in mind 
when they call for trials in transitions:   
1) Domestic enforcement agents use punishment of individual abusers to deter those same 
abusers from committing future abuses. 
2) International and transnational agents use punishment of individual abusers to deter 
those same abusers from committing future abuses.  
3) Foreign governments use punishment of individual abusers to deter those same abusers 
from committing future abuses.  
4) Domestic enforcement agents use punishment to deter generally future abusers in the 
domestic sphere. 345 
5) International and transnational agents use punishment to deter generally future abusers 
in the domestic sphere. 
6) Foreign governments use punishment to deter generally future abusers in the domestic 
sphere. 
7) Domestic enforcement agents use punishment to deter generally present and future 
abusers in the international sphere. 
8) International and transnational agents use punishment to deter generally present and 
future abusers in the international sphere. 
9) Foreign governments use punishment to deter generally present and future abusers in 
the international sphere. 
 Punishing agents need not confine themselves to one object population.  The International 
Criminal Court, for example, might hope to deter specific domestic agents, the general domestic 
population, and the general population in other nations.  Neither is it necessary that one agency take 
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responsibility for trying and punishing all candidates for justice.346  Domestic and international 
agents might coordinate prosecutions.  The categories are not exclusive.  They are merely a tool. 
 
3. The third dimension: subjective dispositions of those deterred 
 Though they add some depth to an understanding of punitive relationships in transitions, 
these nine models leave out what is, perhaps, the most significant dimension of analysis.  Abusers 
are not faceless agents who have indistinguishable attitudes and occupy identical positions.  Abusive 
regimes reflect a broad spectrum of abusers, running from dedicated leaders, to enthusiastic 
followers, to those who abuse only to save themselves.  It is worth distinguishing five groups in 
particular: 
1. Leaders motivated by deep political or ethical convictions tied to an institutionalized 
worldview.347 
2. Leaders motivated by personal interest and ambition.348 
3. Followers motivated by deep political or ethical convictions tied to an institutionalized 
worldview.349 
4. Followers motivated by personal interest or ambition who take advantage of conditions 
under the abusive regime (opportunists).350 
                                                 
346 The possibility of multiple agencies conducting trials raises unique equitable and procedural concerns.  See Christina 
M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan 
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348 This includes individuals who participate in abuse to advance their careers, and individuals who take advantage of the 
vulnerability of victims to achieve more immediate personal and material goals.  Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone and 
Charles Taylor in Liberia fit into this category. 
349 This category includes members of the Rwandan interahamwe, members of the East German Stazi, junta followers in 
Argentina, and members of the German SS. 
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5. Abusers motivated by physical or social pressures, including threats of harm and pressure 
from peers to conform.351 
The primary reason for adding this dimension is to point out that abusers have different orientations 
to abuse.  Deterrence theorists often are accused of falsely presuming that criminals are no more 
than interest calculators.352  While I think this objection is overstated, the underlying point, that the 
position and orientation of actors is a significant factor in their relation to crime and deterrent 
threats, is significant.353   
With this three-dimensional model in view, the remainder of this section will argue that most 
individuals who commit human rights abuses are unlikely to be reached by general deterrence 
strategies, with the exception of leaders, directly exposed to the international sphere.  In addition, 
for followers, punishment does not promise a significant benefit beyond the preventive and 
deterrent effects of transitional changes to the public face of law.  Together these arguments lead to 




                                                                                                                                                             
350 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 110-11.  This includes Germans and Lithuanians who participated in the maintenance and 
cleansing of the ghettos, art collectors who purchased works taken from Jews during the Holocaust, industrialists 
who took advantage of slave labor, and international financial institutions that profit from abuses. 
351 Examples of this category are common in Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, and Rwanda where direct threats to personal 
safety and family were common tools used to recruit and retain abusers.  This category also includes those affected by 
the upside-down world of praise and blame that characterizes abusive regimes.  See e.g. Malamud-Goti, supra note 317 
(discussing the role that institutional praise for human rights abuses that characterized military culture in Argentina 
during the 1970’s and early 1980’s). 
352 J. Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 118 (1984). 
353 Wilson, supra note 331, at 174-177, arguing that most criminals, particularly repeat offenders and “career criminals,” 
are rational in their decision-making.  Wilson also points out that criminals’ decisions may appear irrational to law-
abiding citizens, but that this is due to a disparity in information about the real risks of crime.  Law-abiding citizens 
tend to inflate the risks of being caught and punished.  For a more general survey of literature on the rationality of 
criminals see DAVID J. PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1984), Chapter 3.  
An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming) 
 
 68 
C. The Limited Prospects of General Deterrence from Transitional Trials 
“[G]eneral prevention functions in relation to those who do not ‘need’ it.  In relation to 
those who do ‘need’ it, it does not function.”354  Deterrence is forward looking, designed to inhibit 
persons from choosing355 criminal activity in the future by imposing costs on criminal activity 
sufficient to outweigh benefits.356  Deterrence presumes that criminals make rational cost-benefit 
choices.357  This general conception of agency has some currency in common sense and in 
jurisprudential theories advanced by eminent philosophers from Jeremy Bentham358 through Cesare 
Beccaria,359 John Stewart Mill,360 Oliver Wendell Holmes,361 and H.L.A Hart,362 to contemporary 
proponents of Rational Choice Theory363 and Law and Economics.364  Intuitively, it certainly seems 
that we are inclined to do those things that provide us benefit and disinclined to do those things that 
bring us pain.365  Even granting this, however, it does not follow that everyone works this way in all 
circumstances.   
                                                 
354 Mathiesen, supra note 326, at 231. 
355 One of the most common arguments against capital punishment as a deterrent contends that most murderers do not, 
in fact, act reasonably.  See, e.g., David A. Conway, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations in Dialogue Form, 
in” in PUNISHMENT, 261, 264-65 (A. John Simmons, et. al., eds., 1995).  
356 Posner, supra note 193, at 1205-1214. 
357 I do not want to commit myself to the view that instrumental reason is the only function of our rational faculties.  
Kant, among many others, has argued, quite persuasively, that we have facilities for practical as well as instrumental 
reason.  METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 276, 6:211-14.  For the present, however, I am staying on 
consequentialist ground. 
358 Bentham, Introduction, supra note 193, at 86; Bentham, Principles, supra note 193, at 365.   
359 BECCARIA, supra note 316. 
360 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (2004 ed.); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS, 
1 (1989). 
361 HOLMES, supra note 241, at 34-62. 
362 HART, supra note 152; HART, supra note 194; Hart, supra note 139, at 593. 
363 JON ELSTER, RATIONAL CHOICE, 1 (1986); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, 5 (1957). 
364 Posner, supra note 193, at 1193; PYLE, supra note 353, Chapter 3. 
365 MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note 360, at Ch. 1, part 1. 
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One common critique of the deterrence theorist’s model of agency is that it fails to take 
account of crimes of passion.366  Crimes of passion pose a problem for deterrence in two ways.  
First, passionate criminals by definition, do not act out of a fully rational state and are, thus, unlikely 
to be swayed by remote threats of deterrence.367  Thus, policies focused on general deterrence are 
unlikely to reduce crimes of passion.  Second, passionate criminals, and particularly murderers, are 
unlikely to repeat their crimes, so punishment serves no individual deterrent purpose.368  
 In pre-transitions, “true believers,” committed to the ethical, political, and cosmological 
visions constitutive of an abusive public face of law, commit most atrocities369 and do so with the 
most enthusiasm.370  The fact that many pre-transitional acts reflect passionate commitments raises 
serious concerns for the prospects of deterrence in abusive regimes.371  Like passionate criminals, 
true believers, caught up in the fervor of mass violence, are unlikely to be affected by remote threats, 
particularly when the prevailing public face of law supports the view that what they do is necessary 
and right.372   
Not all crimes are crimes of passion, of course.  One might wonder why, then, the presence 
of laws and law enforcement do not deter all criminals in stable states.  One possibility is that 
                                                 
366 PRIMORATZ, supra note 191, at 39-41. 
367 Andrew Ashworth, Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 50 (Andrew von 
Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, eds., 2d ed. 1998); WALKER, supra note 324, at 16. But see Posner, supra note 193, at 1223 
(arguing that crimes of passion should be more severely punished in order to overcome strong temptation—this 
response misses the point, of course, which is that threats of punishment, no matter how severe, are not sufficiently 
present in the minds of passionate offenders to produce deterrent effects.  As Posner notes, these concerns do not 
diminish incapacitation justifications.). 
368 PACKER, supra note 137, at 52-53. 
369 Kiss, supra note 24, at 74; Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-116.   
370 Id.  See also GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 49-163 (arguing that the pervasive anti-Semitic culture that prevailed in 
Germany during the period leading up to the Holocaust provided Hitler with “willing executioners.”)   
371 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 68-69. 
372 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and Truth 
Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 210 (2000); Sriram, supra note 290, at 394.    
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criminals are “broken,” or at least significantly enough unlike the rest of us to act like they are.373  In 
cases of those with psychopathological and socio-pathological tendencies this may be true, at least to 
some degree.374  But even sociopaths have sufficient interest in their own pain and pleasure to allow 
decision-making consistent with the vision of rational agency critical to deterrence.375  The same can 
be said of many, if not most, perpetrators of large-scale human rights abuses.  Referring to the 
model outlined above, true believers, opportunists, careerists, and even those under physical or 
psychological duress, all make rational choices, though we may fail to fathom their logic.376  With the 
promise of punishment, then, we might hope to tip the scales. 
One might also speculate that criminals are different from law-abiding citizens in ways that 
inoculate them against the deterrent forces of criminal law.  For example, non-criminals are 
predominately more risk averse than criminals, and are apt to inflate or take more seriously threats 
of punishment.377  Non-criminals are also more concerned with public stigma and personal guilt than 
are many criminals.378   Again, that this may be so does not require wholesale rejection of deterrence 
theory.  To the contrary, it proves the broad success of deterrence.  Without any threat, more people 
might be criminals.379  Law-breakers and recidivists may simply have a higher deterrence threshold 
or they may not be in a position to appreciate fully deterrent threats.  Either way, the fact of crime 
does little to disprove the deterrent effect.  Even the most criminally inclined are unlikely to commit 
                                                 
373 Wilson, supra note 331, at 177. 
374 Posner, supra note 193, at 1223-25 (arguing that under a deterrence view, insanity defenses should be limited to a 
limited class of “undeterrables”). 
375 Id. 
376 See generally GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 164-202; Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15. 
377 See generally Posner, supra note 193, at 1193; Wilson, supra note 331, at 177 ff.   
378 Id. 
379 This point is often made in the context of debates about the death penalty.  See, e.g., Conway, supra note 355, at 264-
65.   
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a crime if they know they will be caught and punished.  This fact demonstrates that most criminals 
are rational.  Assuming, for the moment,380 that pre-transitional abusers are as well has interesting 
consequences for deterrence in transitions.   
Many pre-transitional abuses are perpetrated by true-believers who act from conviction as 
much as passion. 381  True believers do not weigh threats of punishment in the same way as stable 
state criminals.  They are motivated not by the prospect of immediate gain, but by a desire to bring 
about a specific vision of the world as it ought to be.382  These are goals worth not only killing, but, 
perhaps, dying for.  A remote threat of criminal sanction is unlikely to be weighed conclusively in 
the mind of such an agent.  In fact, rather than deterring, policies of punishment, whether 
international or domestic, often strengthen the commitments of true believers, deepening the 
damaging effects of the oppositional or bi-polar logic that girds abusive regimes.383   
True believers are not the only perpetrators of pre-transitional abuses of course.  There are 
those who abuse under physical, psychological, or social duress.384  These agents, though more risk 
averse than true believers, are already acting out of a risk assessment that, reasonably and 
predictably, puts a priority on present and immediate threats over remote threats of possible future 
punishments.  In general, agents who act under duress are unlikely to be deterred by exogenous 
threats of future punishment.385  
                                                 
380 That pre-transitional abusers frequently perpetrate atrocities openly, suggests that this assumption is not wholly 
warranted. 
381 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 139; Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-116. 
382 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 139. 
383 MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 83-91; see also ELSTER, supra note 21, at 94; GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 82-83. 
384 Happold, supra note 88, at 1163; GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 96, 249; MINOW, supra note 37, at 35-36. 
385 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67. 
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Abusers who act out of ambition or purely private motives may be more likely to feel the 
threat of deterrence.  Corporate agents and businesses are a good example of risk-averse groups that 
may take a longer view of their actions in abusive regimes.386  The threat of future sanction might 
well provide sufficient threat to deter generally opportunists if they have significant exposure to the 
international community and the threats posed by domestic and international prosecutions.387  High-
level leaders, international corporations, and international financial institutions provide the most 
promising targets.388  The same is not obviously true of domestic opportunists.  They, like smaller 
corporate agents, have a narrower view of the world, limited to the reality projected by an abusive 
regime.  Remote future threats are unlikely to dissuade most such agents.  More importantly, these 
are individuals best viewed as candidates for change.  Those who are not will identify themselves by 
attempting new crimes, solving selectivity problems and avoiding legality concerns.  
 
D. Identification Concerns and the Limited Prospects of General Deterrence 
Deterrence effects are not determined wholly by the receptiveness of potential abusers, of 
course.  General deterrence is also a function of how “present” threats are in the minds of those 
living in abusive regimes.  Certainty, not severity, is the engine of deterrence.389  Without sufficient 
risk of detection and conviction, even the most severe punishment will fail to deter.  In light of the 
                                                 
386 Cf. Levmore, supra note 168, at 1657. 
387 One might hope that banks, for example, will be less likely to support abusive states after recent lawsuits brought 
against Swiss banks by holocaust victims.  See Elizabeth J. Cabreser, Human Rights Violations as Mass Torts: Compensation 
as a Proxy for Justice in the United States Civil Litigation System, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2211, 2248 (2004).  But see Saul Levmore, 
Speculating Law: Beyond Cigarettes and Swiss Banks, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 639, 647 (2001). 
388 MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 10. 
389 BECCARIA, supra note 316, at 68; Andenaes, supra note 316, at 949 (citing studies). 
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unique conditions of abusive regimes, threats of punishment are too ephemeral, removed, and 
temporally remote to provide the degree of certainty necessary to deter. 
 In order to be deterred, prospective abusers must identify with those punished.  If they can 
distinguish themselves and their situations then they are unlikely to feel the threat of punishment, 
and, thus, unlikely to restrain themselves out of fear.390  The three-dimensional model of abusers 
described above indicates that punishing abusers from one category will fail to provide a general 
deterrent effect across categorical lines.  For example, there is no reason to think that punishing 
leaders and intellectual architects will deter on-the-ground abusers.391  Likewise, punishing active 
abusers is unlikely to deter passive opportunists.   
 The problems presented by deterring across classes are common to all categories identified 
above.  Whether the punishing authority is a transitional regime, an international organization, or a 
foreign state, potential abusers will not feel threatened by punishments applied to characters playing 
different roles.  To the contrary, those who might feel some empathetic connection to Slobodan 
Milosevic, say, would more likely be motivated to reduce their apparent responsibility by creating a 
shield of plausible deniability or by spreading responsibility392 than to refrain from pursuing 
ideologically motivated programs of abuse.393   
 Taking account of these concerns seems to argue in favor of broader, more inclusive 
prosecutorial strategies that can capture the attention of all prospective abusers.  As I pointed out 
above, however, it is simply impossible for transitions to prosecute everyone who has had a hand in 
                                                 
390 Malamud-Goti, supra note 317, at 10. 
391 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67; MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 10. 
392 See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 96.  
393 This is, in part, due to the unique motivations and subjective positions of pre-transitional abusers, and particularly 
true believers discussed above.   
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pre-transitional abuses.  Some selections must be made.  In order to both meet this constraint and 
avoid the difficulties of cross-class deterrence, a transition might elect to prosecute representatives 
from each category in the hope of striking fear in the hearts of other caste members.394  While this 
inverted class action approach has some immediate appeal, it fails to address the core worry that I 
have identified.   
 The “cross-class” problem points out that transitional trials and punishments cannot provide 
substantial certainty of punishment.  Total immunity of a class of bad actors fails utterly to deter 
because it leaves members of that class certain that they will not be punished.  Symbolic punishment 
of a few members of a class that may number in the millions fails to deter because it does not 
provide the necessary degree of certainty.395 
 Unlike cross-class concerns, risk problems derived from intra-class selectivity do not affect 
all abuser categories equally.  Selectivity concerns counsel against picking punitive projects that 
cannot be completed.396  By contrast, projects that can be completed may provide sufficient promise 
of deterring those similarly situated in other regimes.397  These considerations recommend 
prosecutions focused on high-level leaders.398  Leaders comprise a group sufficiently small to allow 
complete, and therefore effective, deterrence programs.399  Leaders, exposed to the international 
sphere, also have more perfect information, enhancing their subjective exposure to threats from 
international trials.  Programs that focus on top leaders therefore provide real hope of creating 
                                                 
394 I am in debt to Paul van Zyl for sharing with me this argument for “horizontally-limited” trials. 
395 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67-68; Andenaes, supra note 316, at 949 (discussing the coordinated role of severity and 
risk in the deterrence effect). 
396 De Greiff, supra note 6 at 81.   
397 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 665-66. 
398 MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 10. 
399 Id. 
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productive individual and general deterrence effects, particularly if pursued through stable and 
predictable international enforcement regimes.400 
 
E. Proximity Concerns and the Limited Prospects of Deterrence 
Ignorance and uncertainty, along with delay and debates about the actual rationality of most 
criminals form the core of stable state contests about deterrence.401  My discussion of the subjective 
orientations of pre-transitional abusers to their bad acts has already substantially increased these 
concerns in the transitional context, as have concerns about the degree of risk of punishment that 
can be brought to bear on pre-transitional agents.  Failures to communicate derived from isolation 
and ignorance further diminish the possibility that a general deterrence effect can affect institutional 
violence in abusive states.   
In stable states, legislatures and judges do not have direct lines of communication with 
prospective criminals.402  This allows criminals and potential criminals to discount or misunderstand 
the possible costs of their crimes.403  In the transitional context these problems are magnified.  If 
domestic authorities are conducting trials then the deterrent threats postdate abuses.  With respect 
to past wrongs, then, trials serve no deterrent purpose at all.  If transition itself can prevent future 
domestic abuses, then there is no reason to conduct domestic trials to deter domestic abuse. 
Domestic trials designed to produce a general deterrence effect in other countries are equally 
unpromising.  Though the threat derived from a previous transition in country A is prospective with 
                                                 
400 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 665-66. 
401 Wilson, supra note 331, at 178. 
402 Mathiesen, supra note 326, at 228-29.   
403 Id.; see also Wilson, supra note 331, at 177-181. 
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respect to those in country B, any domestic trials eventually conducted in B still require the 
retroactive enforcement of codes and punishments novel to citizens in B.  This natural isolation of 
abusers limits the hope of using domestic prosecutions to communicate clearly with those living in 
other abusive regimes,404 particularly given the fact that a primary tool of abusive regimes is isolation 
of its citizens from the international human rights culture and its members.405   
Citizens of abusive regimes must piece together inevitably diverse and conflicting 
interpretations of events in foreign transitions.406   It is unlikely that these filtered facts and rumor-
filled theories will provide a clear and coherent deterrent threat.407  Thus, there is little hope that, 
however well thought out, the deterrent message from a transitioning country will be felt and heard 
by those living under foreign regimes.  
International authorities or a single nation acting as a global prosecutor for crimes against 
humanity might produce a consistent message.408  It remains uncertain, however, that residents of 
abusive regimes can or will feel the threat of these foreign prosecutions.409  Mass violence and 
institutionalized human rights abuses are a result of the coordinated efforts of abusive regimes.410  
Abusers on the ground may, then, have no clear idea about what goes on outside their borders.  To 
the extent that they do, the messages sent by international prosecutions is inevitably obfuscated, if 
                                                 
404 Sriram, supra note 290, at 394-95. 
405 Aryeh Neier, The Quest for Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 8, 2001, 31, 32. 
406 Id. 
407 This isolation may be fortuitous or, as Malamud-Goti argues, an essential part of an abusive regime’s strategy of 
disarticulating power.  See MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 124-128. 
408 Douglass Cassel, Why We Need the International Criminal Court, 116 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY  532, 533-35 (1999).  
409 James Blount Griffin, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of International Criminal Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L.. 405, 449-3 (2001). 
410 The Radio Télévision Libre de Mille Collines (RTLM) in Rwanda provides a striking example of the role that public 
propaganda can play in genocide.  The principals in the RTLM were convicted of genocide and incitement of 
genocide before the ICTR in 2003. 
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not perverted, by the abusive regime.  True believers are particularly vulnerable to counter-claims on 
behavior made by an abusive public face of law since they are easily convinced of global conspiracies 
against their causes.411   
Though, as I have pointed out, leaders who are true believers may not properly account for 
threats of punishment from an International Criminal Court or Belgium, say, they are certainly in a 
position to have clear and convincing evidence that they are vulnerable to prosecution.  We may 
hope, then, that leaders directly exposed and responsible to international law may be deterred by the 
prosecution of those like them.412  This may be an unrealistic hope, given the horrible potentials of 
ambition and zealotry,413 but at least there is structural promise of deterrence in these cases.  There is 
little or none with respect to those living behind the veil of an abusive public face of law. 
 
F. Immediacy and the Limited Prospects of Transitional Deterrence 
Immediacy is central to the effectiveness of general deterrence strategies.414  Criminals 
naturally discount threats of punishment that are too far in the future.415  As argued above, most 
who commit abuses in pre-transitions are unlikely to feel the threat of punishment from 
international agents.  For those who might feel some external threat, the threat is not immediate or 
definite enough to provide a significant deterrent effect, given that immediately present domestic 
institutions support abuse through, at least, the public face of law.  
                                                 
411 See e.g. GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 210-212. 
412 Cassel, supra note 408, at 534. 
413 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 68. 
414 BECCARIA, supra note 316, at 68. 
415 Edmund S. Howe & Cynthia J. Brandau, Additive Effects of Certainty, Severity and Celerity of Punishment on Judgments of 
Crime Deterrence Scale Value, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 796, 806 (1988). 
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 True believers are unlikely to either respect or fear external threats.416  Moreover, their 
commitments to the normative, ontological, and teleological systems that justify abuses, in 
combination with commitments to abusive regimes, make them comfortable with risk.417  Domestic 
opportunists might be more vulnerable to deterrence, but they too act within the mediating threat 
structure of an abusive regime, and are more likely to act in accordance with these immediate 
demands, discounting remote, vague, external, and future threats.418  
Those acting under duress are even less likely to be deterred by the distant threats of outside 
agencies.  By definition, these individuals are both risk averse and predisposed not to commit human 
rights abuses.  They participate in the violence only because of direct and immediate danger to them 
or their families.  Like opportunists, it is unreasonable to expect them to expose themselves to 
immediate harm in order to avoid distant and remote threats of punishment.   
 Immediacy is also a problem for leaders.  In order to feel the force of any deterrent threat, 
they must imagine that their power is limited and that their reign will end—and soon.  
Unfortunately, humility and a healthy sense of mortal vulnerability are not common characteristics 
of despots.  Zealots and leaders motivated by ambition are unlikely to modify their behavior by 
looking toward the day when they will have fallen from power.  While this concern is real enough, it 
is not a structural problem.  The worry is essentially the same as the more general concern that 
criminals are hard to deter because they do not commit their crimes expecting to be caught.419  In 
                                                 
416 Elster, supra note 330, at 36-38. 
417 Id. 
418 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67; Cf. MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 10-12. 
419 David Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket's Hanging, 4 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 295, 
308 (2002) (discussing variety of psychological dispositions limiting effectiveness of deterrence). 
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theory, then, an international enforcement regime could provide sufficient risk of punishment for 
leaders directly exposed to international law.   
 
G. Transitions Deter Future Domestic Abuses 
As with all policies justified by a balancing of consequences, punishment as deterrence must 
provide more benefit than harm.420  Trials present real risks of harm to transitions and transitional 
goals of peace, stability, and the rule of law.421  These risks are justified only if there is no less costly 
way to prevent future abuses.422  Trials, with the exception of trials focused on high-level leaders, do 
not add significantly to the deterrent effects provided by transition itself.  Taking account of this 
balance points toward a strategy of vertically limited trials identical to that proposed by my excuse-
centered approach. 
One of the main arguments advanced in this article is that human rights abuses on a scale 
that calls for transitional justice are a function of abusive cultures and systems of institutionalized 
violence that constitute an abusive public face of law.  Absent a pervasive and institutionalized anti-
Semitism the Holocaust would not have happened.423  Absent widespread commitments to a 
“Hamitic myth,” supported by public institutions, there would have been no slaughter in Rwanda.424  
Without a war on communism, accompanying beliefs about the pernicious communist threat, and an 
                                                 
420 Jamal Benomar, Justice After Transitions, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 32, 41-42. 
421 MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 5. 
422 Ruti Teitel, How are the New Democracies of the Southern Cone Dealing with the Legacy of Past Human Rights Abuses?, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 146, 149. 
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institutional reliance on the military there would have been no “Dirty War” in Argentina.425  This 
suggests a simple objection to deterrence in transitions. 
If large-scale human rights abuses are, in part, a function of extraordinary historical, political, 
legal, and cultural circumstances that create unique incentive structures,426 and transitions, by their 
nature, mark a shift in these conditions, then transitions may expect that there will be an 
accompanying shift in citizens’ public behavior.427  For those whose actions were a function of 
conditions in the past regime, shifting conditions in transition prevent future abuses by removing 
motivation, justification, and opportunity.  Given transitional shifts in the public face of law, 
punishment does not provide additional benefit with respect to preventing future abuses.428  This is 
true individually and generally.   
Prompt and certain prosecutions of post-transitional bad actors will serve notice of a new 
regime’s authority and its commitment to securing human rights.  It will also heighten transitional 
notice, targeting deterrent threats at those who are contemplating future abuse.  Retroactive 
punishment of pre-transitional crimes does not, as I have argued, so clearly communicate the 
objective and direction of the new state’s deterrent will;429 nor would it be narrowly targeted to the 
audience most in need.  Moreover, retrospective trials would draw on limited police and judicial 
resources, limiting the capacity of a new regime to deal with new offenses quickly and consistently.430  
                                                 
425 MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 2-56. 
426 GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 21. 
427 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 70-71 (arguing that changing personal beliefs and social norms provide better hope of 
preventing crime).  
428 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 66. 
429 For example, these efforts may, as I argued above, be seen as arbitrary, vengeful, or purely political. 
430 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 652; ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 72. 
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The purposes of prospective deterrence are, then, best served by punishing post-transitional 
offenses rather than reaching into the past. 
 One might argue that some criminal review of past wrongs might make these deterrent 
threats more convincing.431  I admit the possibility of this effect.  However, doing so does not 
commit me to more trials than those already allowed under my excuse-limited scheme.  Punishing 
high-level leaders would certainly serve as sufficient demonstration of a new regime’s commitment 
to protect rights once routinely violated.  Selective punishment of others would serve no additional 
good.  The better course in most cases is to focus on truth commissions and other procedures 
designed to capitalize on the transitional potential of former abusers and solidify transitional 
commitments.432  Social conversion is, of course, a long-term goal.  In the meantime, prosecutions 
based on post-transitional offenses provide necessary deterrence and security.   
 
 
H. Transitions Obviate the Need for Incapacitation 
A transitional regime might justify incarceration for the practical purpose of incapacitation.433  
On closer examination, however, the need for incapacitation and the balance of its costs and 
benefits suggests limiting its application in ways similar to those of deterrence.  Incapacitation faces 
two main objections in stable states.  First, incapacitation presents a moral problem in that 
individuals are punished for offenses that they have not yet committed.434  Second, incapacitation 
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depends on an ability to predict accurately who is likely to commit crimes in the future.435  Both 
these concerns are salient to transitional justice. 
The first objection is primarily moral and, for a consequentialist, is not difficult to set aside.  
We do, as a matter of fact, deny innocent people their freedom because of the potential danger they 
pose to the public when we institute quarantines.  Such policies are warranted in light of necessity 
and a familiar balance of harm and benefit.436  Loss of freedom and compromises against fairness 
may be costs in the equation, but are not determinative.  The same is true of potential criminals.  
They pose a risk of harm accruing to society.  In transitions they may even represent a risk of 
counter-revolution and a return to the oppressive ways of the past.  This seems like more than 
enough danger to justify incapacitation.  It may seem unfair to make assumptions, but the alternative 
is to ask a young democracy to bear the burden of a severe risk.  An argument can be made, then, 
that transitions should not worry too much about making abusers, who have already committed 
harmful, though not criminal, acts, shoulder the risk instead.   
Of course, no society can put everyone in prison.  To justify incapacitation there must be 
some way to narrow the numbers, identifying particular individuals or narrow classes for isolation.  
Despite the popular concerns that incapacitation can justify imprisoning folks with an extra Y 
chromosome,437 or a history of being abused as children,438 this is not what is at stake in serious 
jurisprudence.439  Most incapacitation literature is only interested in predicting recidivism and 
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436 Posner, supra note 193, at 1214-17. 
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criminal advancement.440  This is no easy task; and even the best models are accurate only one-third 
of the time.441  Using these results as the basis for sentencing would mean that sixty-six percent of 
the resources dedicated to incapacitation strategies would have been wasted.  Even if such a low 
average could overcome moral objections, this is not an acceptable ratio in resource-starved 
transitional societies.   
These concerns provide a new perspective on the agency arguments from Sections II and III 
of this article.  Incapacitation as a justification for imprisonment is grounded in a past offense.442  
Most advocates of incapacitation do not see abstract risk, as a function of genetics, class, race, or 
environment, as sufficient to warrant imprisonment.  This is, in part, due to moral concerns, but it 
also reflects the fact that risk predictions are nearly useless in non-criminal populations.  An overt 
criminal act is, thus, a necessary risk factor.443  Guilt is a necessary first step for justifying 
incapacitation.444  This puts us back on the hook of earlier concerns about establishing guilt for 
many abusers from the past regime. 
The reader might think that this misses the point slightly.  Former abusers have, after all, 
done wrong.  Whether the overt act is a “crime” or not is irrelevant next to the fact that it signifies a 
propensity to such activities and presents a risk to the new regime.  This response fails to understand 
the significance of public agency here and in the legality discussion above.  The consequentialist, to 
justify incapacitation in transitions, must rely almost exclusively on past acts that were publicly 
accepted, and sometimes expected, as evidence that those who followed the rules in the past will 
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break them in the future.  This requires making the unwarranted assumption that former abusers will 
not change their behavior as the political culture and legal structure of society change. An agent-
centered understanding of pre-transitional abuses should lead us to see many, if not most, former 
abusers as candidates for change.445  Presuming, without further warrant, that they are not eligible 
for reform, raises moral concerns that also have consequential import.   
Given the fact of transition and accompanying shifts in law and public norms, it seems 
neither fair nor useful to assume that those who abided by the public face of law in the past will not 
do so in the future.  Moreover, the agency focus makes the point that strategies of broad 
prosecution will alienate individuals who might be valuable to a transition, provided that they are not 
under personal threat if it succeeds.446  Further, incapacitation policies run the danger of 
perpetuating pre-transitional divisions,447 making counter-revolutions more likely,448 and increasing 
the chances that the transition will ultimately fail to deter future crimes.449 
This discussion preserves the possibility of punishing high-level leaders.  Leaders have a 
significant personal and ideological investment in counter-revolutions.  They also have the 
demonstrated capacity to motivate large groups of individuals to perpetrate horrific acts.  Given 
these demonstrated motives and capacities, incapacitation of leaders, through imprisonment or exile, 
will frequently be a justifiable transitional cost, particularly if these leaders have perpetrated overt 
acts during or after transition that present a direct threat to peace, stability, or the rule of law.    
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 As a final note on this topic it is worth pointing out a distinction between the political 
necessities of transition and legal punishment.  Though law and politics are heavily intertwined, 
more so in transitions, there is still a distinction.  Transitions are committed to transparency when 
making decisions to punish.450  If security is the sole justification, that should be made explicit.  If it 
is for treasonous activity, that should be explicit.  If it is simply a reflection of the transition itself, as 
lustration might be,451 then this should be made explicit.  Failure to provide public justifications runs 
contrary to transitional commitments to democracy and the rule of law and replicates the 
disarticulating use of power that defines abusive regimes.452   
 
V. THE EXCUSE–CENTERED APPROACH IN CONTEXT 
 Transitions cannot, due to practical realities, prosecute all or even most of those implicated 
in widespread abuses perpetrated by and under abusive regimes.453  This selectivity poses a number 
of threats to transitional justice programs.  High among these is the hard-to-swallow fact that most 
of those involved in past wrongs will not be held responsible.454  This failure to assign responsibility 
carries with it the morally disturbing implication that those not punished are not culpable or guilty.455  
Failures to prosecute also present the possibility that the truth of what happened in the past will 
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never be publicly established,456 allowing abusers to carry on without consequence.  Failure to 
establish a publicly legitimate factual account of the past also perpetuates injustices against victims 
by denying them the acknowledgement they deserve.457  This “oblivion”458 hampers efforts to 
identify causes and consequences of pre-transitional institutions and abuses,459 limiting transitional 
efforts to carryout effective reform.460  Without a publicly legitimate account of the past, transitions 
may also face revisionism, denial, and perhaps, counterrevolution.461     
These circumstances and concerns create tremendous theoretical and practical challenges for 
justice in transitions.  This article has sketched a solution to one of these: the need to provide 
theoretical guidance and normative justification for prosecutorial selection.  To this end, I have 
argued that transitional justice programs should provide an affirmative defense that would, as a 
matter of fact, excuse from criminal prosecution most of those associated with pre-transitional 
abuses.  While this is a valuable contribution to transitional jurisprudence, it does not solve other 
transitional concerns, particularly those that flow from the gap between participation in abuses and 
prosecution for past wrongs.  For example, vertically limited trials do not fully appreciate the 
complicity of those not prosecuted.462  While they do provide a forum for establishing the truth 
about the past in broad strokes, prosecutions of a few top leaders do not provide public 
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acknowledgment for most victims.  Thus, they neither meet entirely demands for truth nor do they 
avoid altogether the dangers of oblivion.463  
In most transitions, these concerns have led to compromise programs, featuring limited 
prosecutions that focus on top leaders, amnesties, truth commissions, and reparations.464  Many 
European transitions have also utilized lustration.465  Just as prosecutorial selections may be criticized 
as compromises against justice, the other elements of hybrid programs are usually seen as gap filling 
strategies.466  Together, they provide the best approximation of justice in a very imperfect world.467  
In this final section, I discuss how my excuse-centered approach can provide significant promise for 
resolving these concerns while providing guidance and justification for other elements of hybrid 
justice programs.   
 
A. The Affirmative Defense Approach Guides and Justifies Prosecutorial Selection 
Structuring prosecutorial selectivity around an affirmative defense has significant advantages 
in the context of transitional justice specifically and transitions to democracy more generally.  First, it 
requires substantial engagement with abusers, victims, witnesses, and society.  If the burden of 
overcoming the defense fell on prosecutors then usual procedural protections and natural motives of 
defendants to avoid punishment would prevent a full hearing of the facts and circumstances..468  By 
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making the defense affirmative, transitions put the burden of revelation on defendants.469  Because 
former abusers cannot claim the defense without producing evidence on their own behalves, making 
the defense affirmative provides individual motivation for pre-transitional bad actors to participate 
in revelatory processes such as truth commissions, dramatically enhancing the quality of the “truth” 
produced by commissions.470  
Second, making the defense affirmative gives prosecutors more control over selections.  
Evidentiary limitations might well force officials to forgo prosecutions if defendants have a 
presumptive defense.  Affirmative defenses allow prosecutors to make principled decisions based on 
real information rather than allowing circumstances to force them to make blind choices or to 
provide de facto amnesties.471  Selections made on rational evidentiary grounds also preserve scarce 
prosecutorial and judicial resources472 while providing publicly justifiable reasons for prosecutorial 
selections.473   
 
B. The Transitional Contributions of Truth Commissions 
 Truth commissions have been integral parts of transitional justice programs in many 
countries.474  While a discussion of these procedures is beyond the scope of this article, this sub-
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section describes some of the goals and aspirations of commissions in order to explain how an 
excuse-centered approach can advance these goals.  
 There are a number of truth commission models.475  At base, however, all share a common 
conviction: that construction of a publicly legitimate and descriptively accurate account of the past is 
critical to political struggle and reform in transitions to democracy.476  What counts as “truth” in this 
context varies widely.477  At a minimum, truth commissions try to produce a detailed and accurate 
account of what happened to whom, when, and how.478  Commissions also try to determine who 
was implicated in past wrongs,479 why atrocities were committed,480 and how perpetrators were able 
to pursue programs of destruction.481  The mandate of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee, for example, was to “establish as complete a picture as possible—including antecedents, 
circumstances, factors and context of such violations as well as the perspectives of the victims and 
the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations.”482 
The provision of a publicly acceptable account of the past serves several transitional goals.  
Most prominent is prevention of future abuse.483  By uncovering the causes and circumstances of 
past abuses, transitional regimes hope to develop new social norms and public procedures that will 
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reduce the chance of future violence.484  In addition to content, then, truth commissions provide 
important opportunities to model procedural commitments violated under the old regime.485  By 
publicizing accounts of the past, for example, commissions mark a break from abusive regimes, 
where opacity and rarified power are essential tools of disarticulate power.486  Commissions also 
offer recognition of victims and the wrongs they have suffered,487 modeling transitional 
commitments to democratic principles of recognition, inclusion, and participation.488 
Truth commissions also count restoration and reconciliation high among their goals.489  By 
providing opportunities for past abusers to confess and for victims to tell their stories, truth 
commissions hope to reconcile a transitional society with its past and to set the stage for victims to 
be reconciled with their abusers.490  Through this process of confrontation and reconciliation, truth 
commissions aspire to establish the conditions necessary for social, political, and legal justice.491  In 
addition, by identifying what went wrong in the past492 and charting new public norms and 
procedures that will prevent future abuses,493 commissions establish and model the public 
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commitments that form the foundation upon which a new society committed to democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law can be built and sustained.494   
 A publicly established truth about the past can also provide some consequences for 
wrongdoers.495  While actual criminal punishment is usually divorced from or excluded by truth 
commissions,496 publicized truth can provide a form of public shaming that is punitive in 
character.497  By identifying wrongs and wrongdoers, often with the aid of dramatic victim testimony 
and forensic reports, truth commissions also set the stage for individuals to recognize what they 
have done and to assume moral accountability for the past.498  This educative function of truth 
procedures is aided by victim participation,499 providing obvious benefits for prevention and 
restoration.500     
Civil society should play a critical role in and be a significant beneficiary of truth 
commissions.501  South Africa provides a good example.502  There, daily events were broadcast and 
nightly analyses conducted.503  The processes of the TRC, as well as its daily product, were publicly 
accessible and were the source and topic of significant discussion and debate.504  Nigeria took a 
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similar approach.505  This daily presence encourages truth seeking outside of the commission while 
working to prevent oblivion, denial, and revisionism.  Public truth commissions also provide a 
model for civil society, establishing the groundwork of a transparent politics of inclusion.506 
These varied goals require that commissions regard “truth” as multi-faceted.507  A primary 
benefit of commissions, as compared to criminal trials,508 is a freedom from rules of evidence and 
other procedural limitations on testimony, including rights against self-incrimination and limitations 
on hearsay evidence.509  Truth commissions can afford these looser protocols because they cannot, 
by definition, result in individualized criminal sanctions.510  Truth commissions provide plenty of 
room for normative evaluation, however.  Assessment of right and wrong is critical to 
acknowledging what happened, recognizing the suffering of victims, and striking a contrast between 
past and future.511  The latitude afforded to truth commissions also provides the opportunity to hear 
from a wide variety of sources, including victims, witnesses, and abusers.512  Further, testimony can 
take the form of narratives of personal experience.513  This flexibility expands further the scope of 
truth while offering recognition to those whose stories were, in a past, suppressed and ignored.514 
                                                 
505 Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in East Germany and South 
Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 89, 140-41 (2001). 
506 du Toit, supra note 487, at 124-26.   
507 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 33-42; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 667. 
508 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 74-75. 
509 See generally Levinson, supra note 106, at 211. 
510 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 49.  But see, HAYNER, supra note 39, at 107-109, 127-132.   
511 HAYNER, supra note 39, at 29-30. 
512 Minow, supra note 14, at 239; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 657. 
513 Kiss, supra note 24, at 70; Boraine, supra note 469, at 151. 
514 Id. at 72-74; Minow, supra note 14, at 239. 
An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming) 
 
 93 
Commissions need not produce a final decision or reflect a perfect consensus.515  Given the 
broad scope of commissions, consensus may well be impossible.516  A consensus truth might also fail 
to capture the complexity of the past.517  This is not a disadvantage.  Destruction of diverse opinion 
is, after all, a hallmark of abusive regimes.518  Forcing commissions to pursue a consensus view is, in 
this light, radically undemocratic.519  What truth commissions can do is provide a shared experience 
of pursuit and, by conducting themselves in the light of transitional commitments to human rights 
and the rule of law, create a shared “universe of comprehensibility” of the past.520 
 Finally, truth commissions seek to define new social, political, and individual normative 
identities.  Anthony Duff and Jean Hampton, among others, have argued that trials play an 
important role in society by expressing and reaffirming social and legal commitments.521  For these 
theorists, the process of trial and punishment is a process of re-presenting social norms and 
expressing social approbation and approval.  Truth commissions have the same potential, though 
their orientation is prospective and aspirational rather than retrospective.522  
 
C. An Excuse-Centered Approach Justifies and Organizes Truth Commissions 
 The excuse-centered approach to transitional justice proposed here provides important 
structural guidance and motivational support for truth commissions.  It also advances the goals and 
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opportunities of truth commissions while avoiding the most pernicious objections to these 
procedures and the amnesties that they entail.   
 A critical practical feature of the defense proposed is that it is affirmative.  Within the rule of 
law embraced by transitions, prosecutors carry the burden of proof in criminal trials.523  Affirmative 
defenses represent an exception to this rule.  Defendants who assert an affirmative defense must 
prove the elements of the proposed defense.524  Truth commissions are ideal forums for developing 
the record needed to make these selections, particularly if those who seek to avoid prosecution must 
testify about what happened, what they did, and why.525  They cannot be taken at their word, of 
course.  Commissioners must investigate these accounts by hearing additional testimony and by 
examining relevant evidence.526  After the investigation is complete, commissioners acting within the 
model I am developing here would make recommendations to prosecutors who will make final 
selections based on these recommendations and their own independent assessments.527 
A model of transition justice that requires testimony at a truth commission as a pre-requisite 
for securing immunity from prosecution may seem to create motivational528 and, perhaps, due 
process problems.529  These concerns are easily salved by “use immunity” and “derivative use-
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immunity” arrangements.530  Within these agreements, prosecutors may not use information learned, 
from compelled testimony to prosecute their case against the accused.531   
This excuse-centered structure enhances significantly the truth seeking potential of 
commissions.  Because commissioners cannot produce a verdict, their recommendations to 
prosecutors are not binding, and the evidence they produce is not accessible for prosecutions, 
commissions are free of the constraints and pressures of evidentiary rules and due process 
protections.  This freedom from constraints allows commissions to develop more detailed and 
complete accounts of the past than would be possible in a criminal trial.532  Rather than establishing 
what truth they can within procedural constraints, commissioners can, and should, concentrate on 
developing an extensive and detailed account of what happened, who was involved, and why.533  
These open procedures produce accounts of the past that are broader, deeper, more detailed, more 
accessible, more acceptable, and more legitimate in the public eye than would be possible in trials.534   
Unlike criminal trials, truth commissions organized for the purpose of making prosecutorial 
selections provide a compelling motivational structure that supports truth seeking.535  First, by virtue 
of the formal separation between commissions and trials, nothing a former abuser says in a truth 
commission procedure can be used against him.  Second, where admission to crimes in a criminal 
trial brings the promise of punishment, admission to abuses before a truth commission offers hope 
of security from prosecution.  Third, abusers know that lies and omissions may leave them 
                                                 
530 See, e.g., Nigeria’s Tribunals of Inquiry Act, § 8. 
531 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
532 Rotberg, supra note 9, at 13. 
533 De Greiff, supra, note 63, at 105; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 32-42.  
534 De Greiff, supra, note 63, at 105; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 32-42. 
535 Kiss, supra note 24, at 76-77; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-27; Minow, supra note 14, at 235. 
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vulnerable to future prosecution.536  Finally, because testimony cannot be used to prosecute others, 
witnesses, including both victims and abusers, need not fear reprisals.  Further, as opposed to 
criminal trials, victims are not limited as to the form of their testimony or subjected to aggressive 
cross-examination.537  Instead, victims tell their stories in their own ways, offering a moment of 
public acknowledgment, denied to them by oppressive regimes and by trials, where the focus is on 
the defendant and his rights.538 
 This, then, is the outline of how the excuse-centered approach would function procedurally 
within a broader transitional justice program.  Open truth commission procedures, protected by use 
immunity safeguards, would provide a forum for developing a full account of the past.  At 
reasonable times during these procedures, commissioners would make recommendations to 
prosecutors regarding who should and should not benefit from the proposed affirmative excuse.  
Prosecutors would make the final decision.  Any bargains accepted by prosecutors would ultimately 
be subject to revocation if later discoveries revealed that an abuser has withheld significant facts 
about his past bad acts.539  Alternatively, if officials decide to prosecute an abuser based on or 
despite the recommendations of commissioners, then they would not be allowed to make 




                                                 
536 The Truth and Reconciliation Committee imposed this rule.  See Kiss, supra note 24, at 76. 
537 Kamali, supra, note 505, at 140-41 (noting that adversarial structure of Nigerian truth commission severely diminished 
its reliability). 
538 du Toit, supra note 487, at 122. 
539 Kiss, supra note 24, at 76. 
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D.  An Excuse-Centered Approach Resolves Dilemmas of Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions, as they are usually understood, propose a “trade-off” between justice, as 
criminal punishment, and truth.540  In order to minimize what is lost in this trade-off, advocates for 
commissions have developed jurisprudential theories designed to satisfy the call for justice in 
transitions.541  In “The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions,” Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson argue that these theories must satisfy three minimal demands.542  First, commissions 
must appeal to a moral principle that is at least comparable to the moral principle of punishment 
sacrificed in the trade-off.543  Second, commissions, in order to reflect commitments to democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law, and in order to maximize the public legitimacy of the truth they 
produce, must be inclusive and broad in spectrum, providing an opportunity for recognition and 
participation to as many individuals as possible, including both victims and abusers.544  Third, 
commissions must develop morally rich practices that reflect their principled goals but also provide 
a model for democratic and rule of law procedures going forward.545  The second and third 
requirements are simple design challenges.  The more difficult task is to provide a morally satisfying 
justification for the “trade-off.”  Theories of “restorative justice” have emerged as the most 
common response.546   
                                                 
540 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 22-24. 
541 Kiss, supra note 24, at 68.  This effort has been aided by recent contributions from traditional criminal theory circles. 
See, e.g., GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEAS, VALUES, DEBATES (2002); LODE WALGRAVE, ed., 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW (2002).  Restorative justice presents numerous promises and problems, a full 
discussion of which must wait for a later time. 
542 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 23. 
543 Id. at 23, 27. 
544 Id. at 23. 
545 Id. at 23-24. 
546 ASMAL, supra note 520, at 12-27; FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, Chapter 5 titled Concepts and Principles; TUTU, supra note 
24, passim; Kiss, supra note 24, at 68-69; Llewellyn, supra note 24, at 96-111.   
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 The central insight of restorative justice in the transitional context is that pre-transitional 
abuses are symptoms of social and political pathologies.  Liberal revolutions represent breaks with 
the past.547  Restorative procedures provide a path to the future by laying the groundwork for social, 
political, and legal change.548  In addition, they seek to produce shifts in public institutions and the 
public and private consciousnesses of citizens.549  The ultimate goal, of course, is to reconcile a 
transitional society with its past, and, perhaps, victims with abusers, in order to prepare the ground 
for a stable society dedicated to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.550   
 Criminal punishment represents, in the restorative justice scheme, both a failure to 
appreciate the unique features of past abuses and a practical threat to the success of transition.551  So 
viewed, broad programs of prosecution conflict, theoretically and practically, with transitional 
demands to restore or create the conditions necessary to ensure the success of a new regime.552  
Given this conflict, restorative justice advocates argue that establishment of a stable post-transitional 
society provides a moral imperative that trumps obligations to punish.553   
 In place of punishment, restorative justice seeks to, descriptively enough, restore (or create) 
the social conditions necessary to ensure the success of transition.554  Truth commissions, by 
                                                 
547 Bhargava, supra note 100 at 50-51, MINOW, supra note 37, at 2-3. 
548 Sarkin & Daly, supra note 483, at 697-700; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 667. 
549 Minow, supra note 14, at 243-45; De Greiff, supra, note 63, at 105. 
550 Minow, supra note 14, at 250-52; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 667.  
551 Aukerman, supra note 4, at 66. 
552 Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 73 (2002). 
553 Minow, supra note 14, at 252-55; MINOW, supra note 37, at 91-92; see also TUTU, supra note 24. 
554 See generally TUTU, supra note 24, Kiss, supra note 24, at 68 ff. 
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focusing on admission and contrition555 rather than adversarial prosecution and punishment, better 
reflect the demands of restorative justice.556  In addition, careful attention to how commissions 
conduct their business provides the promise that they can construct a foundation for transitional 
commitments to human rights and the rule of law and provide a model for democratic 
procedures.557  These goals, along with more purely practical demands bound up with resource 
allocation and stability,558 justify the truth for justice trade-off. 
 I think that the restorative rationale for truth commissions presents serious concerns.  While 
a full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article, it is enough for now to recognize that 
even these hopeful theories must live with sighs of resignation lurking in the background.559  
Whether truth commissions mean to fill in the gaps or to provide an exclusive alternative to trials, 
theorists and practitioners admit that something is being given up.560  Public admission and even 
public shame are not what most think about when they call for punishing abusers.561  Solace taken 
from restorative justice theories is just that, solace.  The trade-off still exists, leaving truth 
commissions and interests in restoration with the damning label of “best possible justice.”562 
Truth commissions conducted within an excuse-centered approach need not wither in this 
darkness.  Suggestions that commissions involve a trade-off are only sensible if one assumes that 
                                                 
555 Neither contrition nor forgiveness can be forced, of course, and the success of commissions should be contingent on 
neither.  See Minow, supra note 14, at 249;  JEFFREY MURPHY AND JEAN HAMPTON; FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 80, 
149 (1988). 
556 Kiss, supra note 24, at 79-83. 
557 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 35-42. 
558 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 648-53. 
559 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 22-26. 
560 Rotberg, supra note 9, at 7. 
561 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 25. 
562 Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 310. 
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those offered amnesty should be punished, but, due to circumstances, cannot be.  Within the excuse-
centered approach, those implicated in past wrongs are invited to participate in truth seeking 
procedures, along with victims, witnesses, and other relevant sources, in order to determine what 
justice demands.  Provision of an excuse within this model is, by definition, in accord with the 
demands of justice.  Thus, truth commissions conducted in service of an excuse-centered approach 
do not trade truth for justice; they elicit truth in the service of justice.  Provision of an excuse does not 
imply an exchange of truth for punitive right because those who qualify for the affirmative excuse 
should not be punished.   
 None of this discussion minimizes the significant benefits to transitions that truth 
commissions may bring in terms of restoration and other important goals.  Within an excuse-
centered jurisprudence of transitional justice, these goals just do not provide primary justification for 
truth commissions.  Rather, commissions serve criminal justice needs first.  This is what justifies 
their place in a transitional justice programs. 
 This brief discussion does not claim to address sufficiently all of the intriguing issues raised 
by truth commissions in the context of transitional justice.  It is meant only to present some of the 
most significant concerns in order to explain how an affirmative excuse-centered approach can 
provide structural and theoretical support for commissions.  It also points out some of the features 
that commissions, conducted at the service of prosecutorial selections, must have.  While further 
discussion of the issues raised in this section would be well worth the time spent, such it is beyond 
the narrow scope of this article.  The present purpose is only to provide a schematic account of the 
role that truth commissions play in a transitional justice strategy guided by the proposed affirmative 
defense. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
This article has defended the proposition that most of those implicated in wrongs 
committed by and under abusive regimes should not be subject to criminal prosecution.  It has 
argued that the prevailing social, legal, and political conditions that characterize abusive regimes 
provide good reason to excuse those who acted consistently with an abusive public face of law, 
which is a distinguishing feature of pre-transitional regimes.  Provision of this excuse does not deny 
that those implicated in pre-transitional abuses have done wrong.  They certainly have.  Consistent 
with this fact, the excuse preserves room for assignments of moral and political guilt.563 
 None of this discussion makes past events disappear.  Clarifying the standing of law and 
public agents in transitions does not meet all transitional justice requirements.  It does, however, 
provide a better picture of what a full transitional justice program might look like.  First, it will be 
centered on extending and developing transitional reforms committed to democracy, the rule of law, 
and human rights.564  Second, the process must provide for the constructive participation of all those 
affected by these changes, including those who legitimately claim the legality defense.565  Third, as a 
function of these two, transitional justice programs must provide opportunities for citizens to 
transition into their new public roles.566  Public agents are candidates for change just as are public 
norms; they should be recognized as participants in a process.567   
Truth commissions as part of the excuse-centered approach fit the unique conditions of 
transitions.  For a justice to be transitional it must acknowledge that it has a duty to justify and 
                                                 
563 JASPERS, supra note 188, at 112-17. 
564 TEITEL, supra note 16, at 215-19; ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 5-24. 
565 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 35-38. 
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establish new public norms.568  This implies taking a coordinative orientation569 with respect to most 
involved in events of the past, while retaining the goal of social expression that is central to both 
justification and application of public law.570  By putting a priority on establishing facts, while 
acknowledging that most participants in past events cannot be held criminally liable, truth 
commissions reflect this premium on coordination.   
Transitions are not wholly coordinative enterprises, of course.  As in functioning 
democracies, there are coercive outcomes.  Those who disagree with changes in public 
consciousness and norms cannot opt for the old ways.  There is another aspect to the focus on 
public agency that comes to the fore here.  Even Kant, perhaps the staunchest of the legal 
deontologists, understood that law has an instrumental character.571  In and after transitions the 
mark of public agency provides for the possibility that those who acted in accord with the public 
face of law in the past will do the same when the law changes.  At least, absent compelling evidence 
to the contrary, a transitional regime should assume that they will.   
The provision of an affirmative defense for most pre-transitional bad actors also preserves 
the possibility of reparations for victims of the past regime.572  “Responsibility” is a notoriously 
difficult word.  One use of responsibility is found in criminal law.  “Responsible” can also have a 
                                                 
568 De Greiff, supra, note 63, at 105-06. 
569 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 38-42. 
570 DUFF, supra note 161, at 124-26, 235-46. 
571 KANT, supra note 276, at 6:232-33. 
572 This discussion of reparations is meant only as a sketch.  A full defense of reparations would require much more.  For 
a helpful discussion of the terrain, see Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical 
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003); Thomas McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of the 
Memory of Slavery, 30 Political Theory 623 (2002); Thomas McCarthy, Reparations for African Americans, in REPARATIONS 
FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS (McGary, ed., 2005). 
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moral dimension, suggesting a free act of will for which the actor is held to blame.573  It can also 
have a political dimension.574  Finally, “responsibility” can have a looser meaning, more prominent in 
some branches of tort law that relies on cause as a key feature generating responsibility to repair.575  
Forgoing criminal blame does not release individuals from responsibility for contributing to the 
success and stability of the new regime.  First, though abusers may not be punished, they are still 
morally culpable for their acts.576  Second, recognizing that many agents of harm in the past regime 
were acting according to the demands placed on them in their public roles suggests that 
responsibility for many pre-transitional abuses falls also on the society that made them possible.577  
Corresponding assignments of moral and political guilt provide ample justification for reparations.578  
Individual duties to repair will vary, of course.  Citizens may bear a higher tax burden in order to pay 
for social programs that benefit victims.579  Corporations and states that realized gains by colluding 
                                                 
573 JASPERS, supra note 188, at 25-26, 57-64. 
574 van Zyl, supra note 5, at 667. 
575 The famous example of the ship’s captain, attributed to H.L.A. Hart, captures much of the spectrum, including this 
band.   
As captain of the ship, X was {1} responsible for the safety of his passengers and crew. But 
on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was {2} responsible for the loss of the ship 
with all aboard. It was rumored that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was 
{3} responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved quite {4} irresponsibly and 
various incidents in his career showed that he was not a {5} responsible person. He always 
maintained that the exceptional winter storms were {6} responsible for the loss of the ship, 
but in the legal proceedings against him he was found {7} criminally responsible for his 
negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was {8} legally responsible for the 
loss of life and property. His is still alive and he is {8} morally responsible for the death of 
many women and children. 
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with an abusive regime may be required to return ill-gotten profits and to contribute to reform and 
reparation programs.580  Others may be called upon to return land or other property appropriated 
under the eye of the old guard.581  What is important, however, is that these duties flow not from 
criminal liability but from a recognition that abuses of the past would not have occurred but for the 
complicity of an abusive society, its members, and enablers.     
As a practical matter, the excuse-centered approach advanced here does not suggest radical 
changes to transitional justice practice.  Due to a number of circumstances, most transitional regimes 
adopt hybrid strategies of transitional justice that look much like the excuse-centered program.  
What the approach offers is normative justification and guidance for what otherwise are ad hoc 
strategies that appear to involve significant compromises against justice.  By providing a detailed 
excuse and defending its elements against common concerns that circulate through transitional 
justice debates, this article has attempted to provide practical as well as theoretical guidance for 
practitioners faced with the unique challenges of seeking justice in transitions.   
                                                 
580 Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 324-27.   
581 Ben Hlatshwayo, Land Expropriation Laws in Zimbabwe and their Compatibility with International Legal Norms, 11 ZIMBABWE 
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